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Delineating Administrative Exhaustion Requirements
and Establishing Federal Courts' Jurisdiction Under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Lessons
from the Case Law and Proposals for Congressional
Action
By Lewis M. Wasserman*
ABSTRACT
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), enacted
through Congress's Spending Clause Power, is the principal federal
statute aimed at insuring that children with disabilities receive a Free
Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) in the nation's public schools.
The Act has spawned a substantial and growing body of litigation
between parents and local and state educational agencies in federal
and state courts during the last decade. During this period nearly
20%-21% of these cases have addressed the issue of exhaustion of
IDEA's administrative remedies, and the related concern about
federal courts' jurisdiction, when the law's exhaustion requirements
have not been satisfied. This article examines and categorizes the
case law on these issues. It considers whether IDEA's exhaustion
requirement is a claims processing procedure or a jurisdiction-giving
provision and challenges the majority view in the circuits where it is
a jurisdiction-giving device. It proposes amendments to IDEA's
section 1415, including the addition of provisions which state with
particularity exceptions to IDEA exhaustion, emanating from the
author's analysis of cases, and the establishment of guidelines to
clarify courts' jurisdiction over IDEA disputes. The author asserts
that Congressional implementation of the foregoing
recommendations will advance IDEA's salutary purpose of affording
each child with a disability a Free Appropriate Public Education by
offering parents, agencies, and courts a more predictable and efficient
structure for resolving disputes arising under IDEA and related
statutes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than 6.6 million children, about 13.5% of the total student
population, receive special education services annually in public
school systems in the United States.' These services are provided
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act
(IDEA or the Act).2 At IDEA's core is the individualized education
program (IEP). IEPs furnish an instructional roadmap and services
protocol for schools to follow for each student with a disability. 3
* Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Leadership and Policy
Studies, Virginia Tech; Ph.D. in psychology, Hofstra University, Hempstead, New
York; J.D. St John's University School of Law, Jamaica, New York. The author
gratefully acknowledges the helpful commentary and analysis of his law partner,
Pamela L. Steen, J.D., M.B.A., of Wasserman Steen LLP, Patchogue, New York, in
the preparation of the manuscript.
1. In 2008, the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) of the
United States Department of Education reported that for school year 2006-07,
6,686,000 students ages 3-21 were served under IDEA. That represented 13.5% of
total public school enrollment. National Center for Education Statistics, Children 3
to 21 Years Old Served in Federally Supported Programs For The Disabled, By
Type of Disability: Selected Years, 1976-77 Through 2006-07,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dO8/tables/dtO8-O50.asp (last visited Oct. 8,
2009).
2. IDEA/2004 was enacted as Pub. L. No. 108-446, and codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1485. It contains Part A-General Provisions, sections 1400-1409; Part B-
Assistance for Education of All Children with Disabilities, sections 611-619; Part
C-Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, sections 1431-1434; Part D-National
Activities to Improve Education for Children with Disabilities, sections 1450-
1482. It is the most recent in a series of enactments beginning with the Education
of the Handicapped Act in 1970. Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. 91-
230, 84 Stat. 175, 175-88 (1970) (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a)). The
original act was amended substantially in the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975 (EAHA), and again as the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act of 1997. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub.
L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773; Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1997, 20
U.S.C. § 1400. In 1990, EAHA-75 was renamed the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act. Learning Disabilities Ass'n of Md., Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of
Baltimore County, 837 F. Supp. 717, 719-20 (D. Md. 1993).
3. The Supreme Court has described the IEP as the "modus operandi" of
IDEA. Sch. Comm. of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359,
368 (1985). The IEP "is a comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a
handicapped child and the specially designed instruction and related services to be
employed to meet those needs." Id. It is described more fully in Part I below.
IDEA has spawned a substantial amount of litigation, wherein
parents and other advocates have contended that students' or
parents' 4 rights were denied under IDEA or other federal statutes
protecting disabled children.5 The clear trend in IDEA and related
litigation, viewed from the perspective of the last decade, is one of an
increased judicial caseload.6 During this time, the percentage of
decisional references to exhaustion of remedies in IDEA cases has
consistently hovered around 20%-2 1%.
4. The issue of parents' rights under IDEA has been a source of controversy.
In 2007 the United States Supreme Court in Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist.,
held that IDEA must be read as a whole and that it makes parents real parties in
interest, with independent, enforceable rights on substantive matters emanating
from the Act. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 530-35 (2007).
Thus, they are not merely representatives of their children in IDEA disputes.
Among other things, this enables them to sue pro se under proper circumstances.
Id.
5. On January 1, 2009 the author conducted a Westlaw search, covering the
last 10, 3, and 2 years, respectively, for the terms "special education" and "IEP".
This search revealed that during the last ten years, 1,969 federal and state judicial
decisions were issued. These were comprised of 1,549 federal and 420 state court
decisions. Three hundred nine of the total reported decisions were issued from
United States courts of appeals. During the last three years 957 such decisions
issued. These were comprised of 767 from the federal system and 190 from state
courts. Of the federal cases, 120 were from United States courts of appeals. In the
last two years, 664 such federal and state decisions were issued. Of these, 518
were issued from the federal courts and 146 from state systems. Of the federal
cases, 73 were from United States Courts of Appeal.
6. An average of 196.9, 319, and 332 federal and state decisions per year
contained both the terms "special education" and "IEP" during the last 10, 3, and 2
years, respectively. This is approximately a 50% increase in the number of judicial
decisions, whether measured by the last 2 or 3 years, compared to the average of
the last 10 years, involving IEP and special education issues.
7. When the search term "exhaustion" was added to the basic search terms
"special education" and "IEP," 408 decisions appeared for the preceding 10 year
period. Of these, 376 were issued by federal courts and 32 by state systems.
Among the federal decisions, 55 were issued by appellate courts. For the last three
years, exhaustion was referenced in 196 cases. Of these, 178 were issued by
federal courts and 18 by state tribunals. Among these decisions, 17 were issued by
United States courts of appeals. For the last 2 years, 141 federal and state decisions
contain references to IDEA administrative exhaustion. Among these, 129 were
produced by the federal system, with 12 of those from United States courts of
appeal. Twelve of the 141 were issued by state judicial systems. Examining these
figures in relation to the total volume of cases for the 10, 3, and 2 year periods,
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Part I of this article describes the substantive rights created by
IDEA, including the duty of Local Educational Agencies (LEAs) and
State Educational Agencies (SEAs) to furnish children with
disabilities a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) through the
IEP. Part II examines IDEA's principal procedural safeguards,
focusing on its due process and state complaint procedures as sources
of securing children's rights when parents or other child advocates
contend LEAs or SEAs have not satisfied their obligations under the
Act. Part III examines the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as to its general purposes and specific application to IDEA.
Part IV examines and categorizes cases, emphasizing situations
where exhaustion was required. Part V looks at the relationship
between IDEA's due process exhaustion requirement and its State
Complaint Procedure. Part VI examines case law, emphasizing cases
where exhaustion was excused. Part VII examines the issue of
whether IDEA's exhaustion requirement is a claims processing
procedure or a jurisdiction-giving provision. Part VIII proposes
amendments to IDEA's section 1415, including the addition of
provisions that state with particularity exceptions to IDEA
exhaustion, emanating from analysis of cases reviewed in Parts IV
and VI, and the establishment of guidelines to clarify courts'
jurisdiction over IDEA disputes. Part IX summarizes the principal
recommendations discussed in the previous sections and the grounds
therefore. Part X, in conclusion, asserts that congressional
implementation of the foregoing recommendations will advance
IDEA's salutary purpose of affording each child with a disability a
Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) by offering parents,
agencies and courts a more predictable and efficient structure for
resolving disputes arising under IDEA and related statutes. Part XI is
an appendix that includes a short glossary of terms commonly used in
the education of children with disabilities, and which appears in this
article.
II. IDEA-CREATED RIGHTS
IDEA is a comprehensive educational scheme, conferring on
disabled students a substantive right to public education and
respectively (408/1969, 196/957, and 141/664), reveals 20.72%, 20.48%, and
21.23% of the cases referenced exhaustion.
providing financial assistance to enable states to meet their
educational needs. 8  Federal funding is conditioned upon state
compliance with IDEA's extensive substantive and procedural
requirements. To qualify for federal funds, the state must have in
effect "a policy that assures all children with disabilities the right to a
free appropriate public education" (FAPE).9 IDEA describes a FAPE
as special education and related services that are provided at public
expense, meet the standards of the SEA, and are rendered in
conformity with an IEP.' ° " Under IDEA, parents collaborate with
teachers and school district representatives in the formulation of the
IEP which must be tailored to the child's unique needs.' 2 The IEP is
the "governing document for all [special] educational decisions
concerning the child."'13 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court
has described it as the "centerpiece" of IDEA's educational delivery
system.14 15 16 17
8. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310 (1988).
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2006).
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006).
11. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982) (describing the
substantive FAPE standard required by IDEA's predecessor, the EAHA).
12. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(14), 1414(d) (2006).
13. Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 218 v. I11. State Bd. of Educ.,
103 F.3d 545, 546 (7th Cir. 1996).
14. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988).
15. IEP content requirements are contained in § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) of
IDEA/2004. They are implemented at 34 C.F.R. § 300.320 (2008). These
requirements include: A statement of the child's present levels of academic
achievement and functional performance; a statement of measureable annual goals,
including academic and functional goals; a description of how the child's progress
toward meeting the annual goals will be measured and when periodic reports on the
progress toward meeting the annual goals will be provided; a statement of the
special education and related services and supplementary aids and services based
on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable, to be provided to or on behalf
of the child; explanation of the extent, if any, the child will not participate with
nondisabled children in school activities; a statement of any individual appropriate
accommodations that are necessary to measure academic achievement and function
performance of the child on state and district-wide assessments; the projected date
for the beginning of the services and modifications the child will receive, along
with the anticipated frequency, location, and duration of those services and
modifications; and appropriate measureable goals for the student's transition to
postsecondary training, education, employment, and where appropriate,
independent living. Id. For an examination of standards for IEP adequacy, see
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III. IDEA's PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
To guarantee that parents have "an opportunity for meaningful
input into all decisions affecting their child's education," IDEA
Phillip K. Daniel, "Some Benefit" or "Maximum Benefit ": Does the No Child Left
Behind Act Render Greater Educational Entitlement to Students with Disabilities?,
37 J.L. & Educ. 347 (2008) (questioning whether NCLB has heightened the IEP
FAPE requirement).
16. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794, 34 C.F.R. §
104.33(b) (2008), creates an independent obligation on SEAs and LEAs, as
recipients of federal financial assistance, to provide a FAPE to disabled students as
defined in that law. Although it overlaps with IDEA's FAPE requirement, it is not
identical. The most important differences are that section 504 requires "a
comparison between the manner in which the needs of disabled and non-disabled
children are met, and focuses on the 'design' of a child's educational program."
Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 933-35 (9th Cir. 2008). The essence of
section 504 is to ensure that the educational needs of handicapped persons are met
as adequately as the needs of non-handicapped persons. Id. Although a valid IEP
is one way of meeting section 504's FAPE requirement, it is not the only way.
This means that a section 504 plaintiff may not state a cause of action for damages
merely by establishing an IDEA FAPE violation. Conversely, a final determination
that IDEA's FAPE requirements were satisfied should be conclusive on the section
504 plaintiff's FAPE claim. See, e.g., M.Y. ex rel. J.Y. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1,
544 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 2008). In M.Y., the Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's judgment that the LEA's refusal to provide summer school
transportation to a child with an IDEA disability did not constitute a section 504
FAPE violation. Since the child's IEP did not contain extended school year
services, that is, provision for summer school, it followed that the district's failure
to provide transportation during summer school was not a section 504 FAPE
violation. Id. For an exposition on section 504/ADA eligibility determinations, see
Perry A. Zirkel, A Step-by-Step Process § 504/ADA Eligibility Determinations: An
Update, 239 Ed. L. Rep. 333 (2009).
17. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132,
extends to state and local government agencies, including public school systems,
the anti-discrimination provisions of section 504. The federal regulations
implementing Title II require public entities to "make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices [and] procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid
discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate
that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
program or activity." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2008). Title II includes § 504's
FAPE obligation. OCR has adopted the standards established under section 504 to
meet the requirements of the ADA, except where the ADA has specifically adopted
a different standard from section 504. See, e.g., Waltham (MA) Public Sch., 29
IDELR 37, 38 (OCR 1993).
prescribes an elaborate system of procedural safeguards. 18 Parents
must be notified, in writing, of changes the school district proposes
or refuses to make in their child's educational program. 9 This notice
must contain a description of the procedural rights available to
parents for challenging the district's decision2 ° and an explanation of
the reasons for the decision.2' Parents have the right to examine their
child's educational records2 2 and obtain an independent educational
evaluation (IEE) of their child when they disagree with the LEA's
evaluation.2 3 Moreover, IDEA requires that states guarantee parents
the right to bring complaints about "any matter relating to the
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or
the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child., 24
IDEA provides two avenues for parents to obtain administrative
relief for such complaints: The "due process" hearing and the "state
complaint procedures" also known as the complaint resolution
procedure (CRP).
A. Due Process Procedures
IDEA due process complaints must:
set[] forth an alleged violation that occurred not more
than 2 years before the date the parent or public
agency knew or should have known about the alleged
action that forms the basis of the complaint or, if the
state has an explicit time limitation for presenting such
18. Honig, 484 U.S. at 311.
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (2006).
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(2) (2006).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (2006).
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2006).
23. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b) (2008). The right to an IEE is conditional in that
the LEA may refuse to pay for the IEE and initiate a due process hearing if it
believes its own evaluation is appropriate. If the decision at due process is that the
LEA's evaluation was appropriate, the parent still has a right to an IEE, but not at
public expense. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(3) (2008). See, Perry A. Zirkel,
Independent Educational Evaluation Reimbursement Under the IDEA, 231 Ed. L.
Rep. 21 (2008) (providing a practical legal checklist synthesizing court decisions
and OSEP policy decisions respecting this right).
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (2006).
25. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151-153 (2008) (state complaint procedures/CRP).
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a complaint,.., in such time as the state law allows.2 6
IDEA requires that after a due process hearing has been
requested, the parties must attend a resolution meeting in an attempt
to put the dispute to rest.27 28
At the "due process" hearing the parties have "the right to present
evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of
witnesses." 29 The due process hearing officer must prepare findings
of fact and a decision. 30  IDEA grants to the states the option of
offering one or two-tier administrative tribunals for review of the due
process complaint. In a two-tier system, the initial forum is the
impartial due process hearing "conducted" by the local school district
(LEA).3' Parties aggrieved by the Tier I decision may appeal the
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B) (2006).
27. 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(a) (2008). Where a settlement is achieved at the
resolution meeting, the parties must execute a legally binding written agreement,
signed by both the parents and a representative of the agency who has the authority
to bind the agency. 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(d)(1) (2008). That agreement is
enforceable in any state court of competent jurisdiction or federal district court or
by the SEA, if it has adopted a mechanism for enforcement of resolution
agreements. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5 10(d)(2) (2008). Although mandatory, the holding
of the resolution session may be waived by written agreement of the parties or if
the parties agree in lieu thereof to participate in mediation. 34 C.F.R. §
300.510(a)(3) (2008).
28. See, e.g., Spencer v. Dist. of Columbia, 416 F. Supp. 2d 5, 11-12 (D.D.C.
2006) (agreeing with the school district that, absent consent of the parties, the
parents' refusal to participate in the resolution process resulted in an exhaustion
failure since such participation was required before due process proceedings could
begin). See also Allan G. Osborne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo, Resolution Sessions
Under the IDEA: Are They Mandatory?, 218 Ed. L. Rep. 7 (2007) (predicting that,
absent agreement between the parties, courts will construe participation in
resolution sessions as a precondition to access to IDEA's due process procedures);
cf R.M. ex rel. R.M. v. Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148-49
(S.D. Iowa 2008) (finding neither "pre-appeal" conference nor mediation replaces
or satisfies the due process requirement).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(2) (2006).
30. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(2) (2006).
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2006). This language is somewhat misleading in that
the LEA essentially arranges for the Tier-I hearing, rather than actually "conducts"
it. Under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A), the presiding hearing officer may not be an
employee of the SEA or LEA or have a personal or professional interest that
conflicts with the person's objectivity in the hearing. Moreover, the hearing officer
must possess knowledge of, and the ability to understand the relevant provisions of
IDEA; possess the knowledge and ability to conduct hearings in accordance with
decision to Tier II review at the state educational agency ("SEA").32
In states adopting a one-tier due process system, the sole
administrative hearing is held by a state agency's hearing officer.
When parents or the applicable agency are aggrieved by the decision
at Tier I in a one-tier state, or the Tier Il decision in a two-tier state,
they may appeal the decision by filing a civil action in federal or state
court.33  IDEA provides a ninety-day limitation period, measured
from the date of the Tier-I decision in a one-tier state or Tier II
decision, for bringing the judicial action for review of the state
agency's final decision, "or, if the State has an explicit time
limitation for bringing such action, . . . in such time as the State law
allows." 3
4
B. State Complaint Procedure/CRP
The state complaint procedures/CRP were promulgated by the
U.S. Department of Education pursuant to its general rulemaking
authority requiring each recipient of federal funds, including funds
provided through IDEA, to put such procedures in place.35  The
regulations require each SEA to adopt written procedures for
"[r]esolving any [state level] complaint" 36 regarding the education
of a child with a disability. Under state complaint/CRP, the
complainant must allege a violation that occurred not more than one
year prior to the date the complaint is received by the SEA.37 The
regulations permit a complaint to be filed under both the state
complaint/CRP and the IDEA due process hearing systems, in which
case the state complaint/CRP must await the due process hearing's
appropriate, standard legal practice; and possess the ability to render and write
decisions in accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice. Id.
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2006).
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2006).
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B) (2006).
35. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151 to 300.153 (2008). For discussions distinguishing
IDEA's due process procedures and the state complaint procedures/CRP, see, e.g.,
Vultaggio v. Bd. of Educ., 216 F. Supp. 2d 96 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 343 F.3d
528 (2d Cir. 2003); Lucht v. Molalla River Sch. Dist., 225 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th
Cir. 2000); and Ass'n for Cmty. Living in Colo. v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040, 1045
(10th Cir. 1993).
36. 34 C.F.R § 300.15 1(a) (2008).
37. 34 C.F.R. § 300.153(c) (2008).
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resolution of overlapping issues.38 A final due process hearing
decision is binding on state complaint/CRP administrators.3 9 State
complaint/CRP administrators must resolve, as well, a complaint
alleging that a public agency failed to implement a due process
hearing decision.40 The regulations require that the SEA resolve the
state complaint/CRP within sixty days after a complaint is filed.41
They do not, however, state that a parent must exhaust the state
complaint/CRP to enforce a due process decision in court. Moreover,
it appears that at least some non-FAPE claims need not be exhausted
through IDEA due process procedures, at least where CRP has been
employed.42 43
IV. THE PURPOSES OF IDEA EXHAUSTION
The rationale for requiring administrative exhaustion before
parties may avail themselves of judicial forums is as follows: It
prevents courts from interrupting permanently the administrative
process, it allows the agency to apply its specialized expertise to the
problem, it gives the agency an opportunity to correct its own errors,
it ensures that there will be a complete factual record for the court to
38. 34 C.F.R. § 300.152(c) (2008).
39. 34 C.F.R. § 300.152(c) (2008).
40. 34 C.F.R. § 300.152(c)(3) (2008).
41. 34 C.F.R. § 300.152(a)(2008).
42. In Christopher S. v. Stanislaus County Office of Educ., 384 F.3d 1205
(9th Cir. 2004), for example, the court held that IDEA due process exhaustion was
not required where three students sufficiently exhausted their administrative
remedies through CRP. This was because they challenged a blanket decision to
shorten the school day for autistic students, including the state policy for treatment
of lunch and recess as instructional time. The court noted that the state's decisions
were made outside of the IEP process. Id. at 1213. See also S.A. v. Tulare County
Office of Educ., 2009 WL 30298, at 6-8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2009) (concluding that
student's IDEA records access claim pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 300.611(b) (2008)
need not be further exhausted after the parents obtained a final decision from the
state under CRP, and noting that the California Department of Education, which
issued the decision, directed that any further disagreement with its decision can be
addressed to a court of competent jurisdiction). Id. at 6.
43. For a useful overview of IDEA's CRP, see Perry A. Zirkel, Legal
Boundaries for the IDEA Complaint Resolution Process, 237 Ed. L. Rep. 565
(2008) (discussing, among other things, CRP jurisdiction, procedures, and
remedies).
review, and it prevents the parties from undermining the agency by
deliberately flouting the administrative process.44  Whether
exhaustion is necessary requires an understanding of the particular
administrative scheme involved.45
Under IDEA, "judicial review is normally not available until all
administrative [due process] proceedings are completed., 46 "IDEA's
exhaustion requirement was intended to channel disputes related to
the education of disabled children into an administrative process that
could apply administrators' expertise in the area and promptly
resolve grievances. 47
Even where an IDEA administrative hearing may be unsuccessful
in resolving a dispute, it may at least have produced a helpful record
because administrators versed in the relevant issues were able to
44. E.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-98 (1969) (holding that
based on the text of the statute potential Armed Forces inductee who failed to
appeal his classification and failed to appear for pre-induction physical did not have
to exhaust Selective Service procedures; the purposes of exhaustion would not be
served since he qualified for an exemption from service as a matter of law).
45. McKart, 395 U.S. at 193.
46. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). See Handberry v. Thompson, 436
F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding, "It is well settled that the IDEA requires an
aggrieved party to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing a civil action
in federal or state court ....... " (quoting J.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d
107, 112 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 968 (2005))).
47. Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 487 (2d Cir. 2002). See also, e.g.,
Ass'n for Cmty. Living in Colo. v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040, 1044 (10th Cir. 1993)
("[Even where plaintiffs] challeng[e] a policy of general applicability rather than an
IEP formulated pursuant to that policy ...... [they] must still show that the policy is
contrary to law and that the underlying purposes of exhaustion would not be served
[citation omitted]"; Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 1992).
Exhaustion of the administrative process allows for the
exercise of discretion and educational expertise by state and local
agencies, affords full exploration of technical educational issues,
furthers development of a complete factual record, and promotes
judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the first opportunity
to correct shortcoming in their educational programs for disabled
children.
Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1989)
(holding, "States are given the power to place themselves in compliance with the
law... Federal Courts-generalists with no exper[ience] in the educational needs of
handicapped students -are given the benefit of expert fact finding by a state agency
devoted to this very purpose.").
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probe and illuminate those issues for the court.48 In deciding whether
IDEA plaintiffs should be subject to the exhaustion requirement,
courts must consider "whether pursuit of administrative remedies
under the facts of a given case will further the general purposes of
exhaustion and the congressional intent behind the legislative
scheme."49
V. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE EXHAUSTION MANDATE
A. Section 1415 's Exhaustion Requirement
1. Direct Actions Under IDEA.
IDEA affords aggrieved parties an opportunity for judicial review
of LEA and SEA IDEA compliance following completion of state
established administrative IDEA "due process" procedures. Section
1415(i)(2)(A) states:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision
made [after completion of the State established
administrative review procedures enacted pursuant to
the IDEA] shall have the right to bring a civil action
with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this
section, which action may be brought in any State
court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of
the United States, without regard to the amount in
controversy. 0
48. See, e.g., Riley v. Ambach, 668 F.2d 635, 640 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussing
benefits of exhaustion in context of IDEA proceedings). Riley seems to stretch the
limits of the exhaustion doctrine. The Riley plaintiffs challenged the state's
regulatory definition of a "learning disability" as contrary to the Act and its refusal
to fund residential placements for students who were classified under that category.
Since the Commissioner of Education enforced the policy and also served as the
Tier II review officer, plaintiffs contended exhaustion was futile. The court
rejected the argument on the ground that, among other reasons, its exposition of the
law might benefit from the application of the agency's expertise to the facts, and if
the agency was given the opportunity, it could correct its own errors. Id. This was
an extremely optimistic view of the benefits to be gained through the administrative
process generally, and in this case, in particular.
49. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted).
2. Section 1983 Actions and Direct Actions under ADA,
Section 504, and other Federal Laws Protecting the Rights of
Children with Disabilities.
IDEA 2004's exhaustion requirement applies to non-IDEA
actions where the putative plaintiff seeks relief which is also
available under IDEA. That provision, section 1415(1) of the Act,
states:
Nothing in this Title [twenty of the United States Code
in section 1400] shall be construed to restrict or limit
the rights, procedures, and remedies available under
the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
[(Title Twenty-nine of the United States Code in
section 790)], or other Federal laws protecting the
rights of children with disabilities, except that before
the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking
relief that is also available under this part [20 U.S.C.
§§ 1411 et seq.], the procedures under subsections (f)
and (g) [the state established administrative exhaustion
procedures] shall be exhausted to the same extent as
would be required had the action been brought under
this part [20 U.S.C. §§ 1411 et seq.].5°
B. Relief Available under IDEA
Relief available under IDEA includes the following: declaratory
orders,5' orders for future conduct,52 compensatory education,53
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) (2006) (emphasis added). In 1986, the Handicapped
Children Protection Act (HCPA) restored the availability of remedies under the
federal Constitution and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended
in section 794 of the Title Twenty-nine of the United States Code, for the
deprivation of disabled student's educational rights, after the Supreme Court's
decision in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984). Smith held, among other
things, that such remedies were unavailable in light of the comprehensiveness of
EAHA (now IDEA). After passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990
Congress enacted legislation that year, requiring IDEA exhaustion for ADA claims
for which relief was also available under IDEA.
51. See Mark C. Weber, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION
TREATISE, 20:22 (3d ed. 2008) (commenting that for reasons of enforceability,
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reimbursement for tuition and other costs incurred to obtain an
appropriate program for the student,54 rescission of diplomas,55
hearing officers should "order" rather than "recommend" placements, citing to Cox
v. Jenkins, 878 F.2d 414 (D.C. Cir. 1989), as a case in point.) Because the
plaintiffs in Cox failed to present the court with an enforceable order, but a mere
recommendation only, it dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Cox, 878 F.2d at 414.
52. E.g., Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 72-73
(1999) (affirming the provision of related services directly ordered by a hearing
officer); Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368-70 (1985)
(stating that in an appeal of a due process hearing order, a court may direct school
officials to implement an IEP placing a child in a private school).
53. E.g., ex rel. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir.
2008) (affirming a hearing officer's award of additional services as a form of
compensatory education to a student whose rights were violated, and noting
permissibility of this remedy for a FAPE denial when the student is still age-
eligible under the Act); Reid ex rel. Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 523-
24 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying for compensatory education award, an individual
assessment approach, aimed at putting the child where he would have been, but for
the FAPE denial). For a developmental perspective on the law of compensatory
education under the Act, see a series of articles on this subject: Perry A. Zirkel,
Compensatory Education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:
The Third Circuit's Partially Misleading Position, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 879
(2006); Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education under the IDEA, An Annotated
Update, 190 ED. L. REP. 745 (2004); See also Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory
Educational Services in Special Education Cases: An Update, 150 Ed. L. Rep. 311
(2001); See also Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedy of Compensatory Education Under
the IDEA, 95 Ed. L. Rep. 483 (1995); See also Compensatory Educational Services
in Special Education Cases, 67 Ed. L. Rep. 881 (1991).
54. E.g., Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 14-16 (1993)
(holding that reimbursement under IDEA to parents who have placed their child in
private school after public school failed to provide a FAPE to their child is not
barred by the private school's failure to meet state education standards, so long as
the private placement is "proper" under the Act); Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass.
Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368-370 (1985). See also Lewis M. Wasserman,
Reimbursement to Parents of Tuition and Other Costs Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 21 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT 171 (2006) (examining elements of IDEA reimbursement claims and
defenses thereto).
55. The rescission issue arises because the student's right to IDEA services
terminates upon graduation with a regular high school diploma. Parents have
sometimes obtained revocation, on the ground that a FAPE was denied prior to the
student's receipt of the diploma, with the effect that the student will continue to be
IDEA eligible. See e.g., Kevin T. v. Elmhurst County Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR 202
(N.D. Il. 2001) (granting preliminary injunction after student had graduated).
expunction of records,56 and payment for independent educational
evaluations (IEE).57 Circuit courts have determined nearly uniformly
that compensatory monetary damages,5 8 and punitive damages5 9 are
not available under the IDEA.
56. IDEA's implementing regulations provide for amendment, 34 C.F.R. §
300.618 (2008), or destruction, 34 C.F.R. § 300.624 (2008), of records under
various circumstances and use of the due process procedural mechanism to obtain
such relief.
57. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(a) (2008). Parents have an automatic right to an lEE
at any time during the child's education so long as the lEE meets the "agency
criteria." Id. Parents have the right to have the lEE considered by the school
district in any decision made with respect to providing FAPE for that student. Id.
58. See, e.g., Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing
Ninth Circuit cases and noting that ordinarily monetary damages are not available
under IDEA); Cave v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist, 514 F.3d 240, 246-47 (2d
Cir. 2008) (citing Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 483-86 (2d Cir. 2002))
(stating that compensatory and punitive damages are not available under IDEA);
Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 34-35 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that
compensatory damages are not available under IDEA and determining that no
monetary relief, including tuition reimbursement and compensatory education, is
available against individual school officials under IDEA); Ortega v. Bibb County
Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (lth Cir. 2005) (citing cases from other
circuits and then concluding that IDEA is not a "tort-like" mechanism for
compensating personal injury); Bradley ex rel. Bradley v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 301
F.3d 952, 957 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that state officials were entitled to qualified
immunity with respect to the plaintiffs' IDEA claims because the plaintiffs could
not recover compensatory or punitive damages under IDEA); Sellers ex rel. Sellers
v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 532 (4th Cir. 1998) (rejecting attempt to
recover compensatory and punitive damages in IDEA action), cert. denied 525 U.S.
871 (1998); Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist., 98 F.3d 989, 991 (7th
Cir. 1996) (concluding that IDEA "with its elaborate provision for educational
services and payments to those who deliver them-is inconsistent with monetary
awards to children and parents"); Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding no "case authority interpreting
[IDEA] to allow an award of general damages for emotional injury or injury to a
dignitary interest"). See also D.G. v. Somerset Hills Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d
484, 494-95 (D.N.J. 2008) (dismissing IDEA claim where plaintiffs sought only
compensatory and consequential damages against the district and observing the
Third Circuit had not yet decided the issue), reconsideration denied, But see Salley
v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 57 F.3d 458, 466 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming
nominal damages award under IDEA, without further discussion).
59. E.g., Cave, 514 F.3d at 246-47; Bradley, 301 F.3d at 957; Sellers, 141
F.3d at 532.
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C. Playing the Exhaustion Field
The exhaustion requirement applies whenever a plaintiffs claims
"relate to" a disabled child's education, within the meaning of the
IDEA,6 ° or where "the injury could be redressed to any degree by
IDEA's administrative procedures". 6' 62 Where IDEA's ability to
remedy a particular injury is unclear, exhaustion under IDEA is
required in order to give the agencies an initial opportunity to
ascertain and alleviate the alleged problem. 63  Whether IDEA
exhaustion is required in a particular case is a question of law.64 It is
60. E.g., M.T.V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1162, 1158-68 (1 1th
Cir. 2006) (finding retaliation claims clearly related to child's evaluation and
education, thus subjecting plaintiffs to exhaustion).
61. Kutasi v. Las Virgenes Unified Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 1162, 1164-67 (9th
Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (suggesting the administrative process might be
helpful to the court with respect to two of plaintiff's eighteen factual allegations
where, after the action was commenced, the SEA on the district's request, found
the disputed IEP failed to offer FAPE).
62. For exhaustion purposes IDEA relief is deemed "available" where both
"the genesis and the manifestations of the problem are educational." Blanchard v.
Morton Sch. Dist., 420 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2005), (quoting Charlie F., 98 F.3d
at 993). However, "IDEA's administrative remedies cannot compensate for a
plaintiff's injuries that are completely non-educational." (citations omitted).
Blanchard, 420 F.3d at 921 (no exhaustion is required where mother's claim relates
solely to her own emotional distress and lost wages, relief not available to her in
the IDEA administrative process, but expressing no opinion on the merits of her
claim). The "relief' that is "available" issue is examined by first asking
whether the 'events, condition, or consequences' of which
Plaintiffs complain, i.e., the nature of Plaintiffs claims and the
alleged harms at issue in [the] case, can be addressed by the
IDEA administrative process. To the extent that Plaintiffs' claims
relate to the 'special education and related services' guaranteed
by the IDEA, and Plaintiffs' injuries can be remedied through the
IDEA administrative process, such claims are subject to the
IDEA exhaustion requirement.
M.G. v. Crisfield, 547 F. Supp. 2d 399, 413 (D. N.J. 2008).
63. E.g., Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 308 F.3d at 1050; Charlie F., 98
F.3d at 991-93; See also McQueen ex rel. McQueen v. Colorado Springs Sch. Dist.
No. 11, 488 F.3d 868, 875 (10th Cir. 2007) (asserting that the overriding
consideration in deciding whether exhaustion should be excused is whether it is
clear at the outset that the administrative procedure under IDEA could not provide
the student with a FAPE to which he is entitled).
64. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992).
reviewed de novo by courts of appeal.65 Most parents seeking to
avoid IDEA's exhaustion requirement have sued under IDEA, or
section 504, or ADA, or section 1983, or under a combination of
some or all of these statutes.
This Part examines and categorizes cases where exhaustion has
been required and, where appropriate, contrasts them with cases
where exhaustion was excused. These overlapping categories
include cases where the parents did the following: Claimed their
child's high school graduation effectively mooted the need for
exhaustion; asserted that their child's treatment by agency personnel
caused psychological harm; attempted to relinquish claims under
IDEA, arguing that this excused them from exhaustion; removed the
child to a private setting and then sought to avoid IDEA exhaustion;
failed to request IDEA programming prior to the initiation and
exhaustion of due process procedures; alleged unlawful agency
policies, but requested individual relief only; claimed that they
received insufficient notice regarding the exhaustion requirement;
failed to exhaust particular issues during the due process proceedings,
though having literally completed that process; asserted in court,
claims arising subsequent to IDEA due process proceedings; and
attempted enforcement in federal court of settlement agreements
entered into outside of a resolution session, or before due process
hearing officers. Each of these categories is discussed in turn.
1. The Post-Graduation Cases
The Ninth Circuit recently held in Fraser ex rel. Fraser v.
Tamalpais Union High School District, 281 F. App'x 746 (9th Cir.
2008), that the parents' failure to use the IDEA administrative
process when it was available to them prior to the student's
graduation did not excuse them from the exhaustion requirement
65. See, e.g., Babicz v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, 135 F.3d 1420, 1421
(11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 816 (1998) (applying de novo standard
where there was no underlying administrative proceeding); P. ex rel. P. v.
Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2008) (de novo standard
applies to both the district court award of summary judgment and whether it
correctly applied the law to the facts, with deference to the SEA's findings).
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post-graduation. 66 In Fraser, the parents sued under sections 504 and
1983 (but not IDEA), claiming that the student suffered mental and
emotional injuries related to the district's initial decision that the
student was not IDEA eligible. 67 The parents claimed that since the
student had graduated, exhaustion would serve no purpose since he
could no longer receive any benefit from the IDEA administrative
process. 68 In rejecting this argument, the court plainly disapproved
of an approach to the exhaustion doctrine which would permit
parents to lie in wait until a student's graduation, and then later
spring on LEAs claims for injuries which could have been timely
cured through the IDEA administrative process. 69
In Polera v. Board of Education, 288 F.3d 478, 480-81 (2d Cir.
2002), the parents sued under ADA and section 504 seeking
monetary damages unavailable under the IDEA, as well as injunctive
and equitable relief clearly available under the IDEA.70  The
gravamen of their complaint was that the LEA denied the student a
FAPE prior to her graduation from high school by failing to provide
adequate study materials and sufficient tutoring services. 71 The court
rejected the parents' futility argument, holding that the IDEA
administrative process was designed precisely to address issues like
Polera's lost educational opportunities and related forms of relief.72
Thus, Polera's claim was dismissed for failure to exhaust IDEA's
administrative remedies.73
In Frazier v. Fairhaven School Committee, 276 F.3d 52, 57-63
66. Fraser ex rel. Fraser v. Tamalpais Union High Sch. Dist., 281 F. App'x
746, 748 (9th Cir. 2008).
67. Id. at 747.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 748. The Fraser court also rejected the parents' argument that "the
school district had a policy of intentionally misinforming or failing to inform
parents and students about the existence of section 504 accommodations, and
[parents] therefore are not required to exhaust the IDEA remedies to seek
injunctive relief for this systemic problem." Id. In rejecting this assertion the court
pointed out that the parents failed to bring their claims as a class action and
moreover, any claim for injunctive relief became moot upon the student's
graduation. Id.
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(1st Cir. 2002), the court held that notwithstanding her graduation
from high school, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative
remedies when she sought only money damages under section 1983
for violations of IDEA, where she alleged among other things, that
the school inappropriately disciplined her for conduct related to her
disability. 14 The court noted that the student's graduation from high
school did not necessarily eliminate the possibility of her receiving
benefits from IDEA, in light of the availability of an in-kind services
remedy under the Act, such as compensatory education, in a proper
case. 75 The court emphasized that the plaintiffs could have invoked
the administrative process at several points during her high school
years, and allowing her to hold back from seeking IDEA-related
relief when the issue arose would undermine IDEA's complex
remedial scheme as designed by Congress.76 77
2. Allegations of Psychological Harm Caused by Agency Personnel
Courts have tended to treat allegations of psychological damage
caused by school personnel to students with disabilities as
"educational in nature" so as to require IDEA exhaustion. In Charlie
F. v. Board of Education of Skokie School District 68, 98 F.3d 989
(7th Cir. 1996), for example, the parents sued under § 1983, ADA,
and section 504 for psychological harm allegedly caused to Charlie
74. Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 57-63 (1st Cir. 2002).
75. Id. at 63.
76. Id. at 62-64.
77. Other cases demonstrate that graduation does not render exhaustion of
IDEA's administrative remedies futile. See, e.g., Ruecker v. Sommer, 567 F.
Supp.2d 1276, 1297 (D. Or. 2008) (holding that for a student with attention deficit
and hyperactivity disorder, graduation did not render administrative exhaustion
futile where that process could have provided any relief for his educational injuries,
including compensatory education, that the student sought in court); Oliver v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. 2004 WL 1800878, at *5-6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11 2004)
(plaintiffs graduation held insufficient to establish futility where plaintiff failed to
follow administrative process and waited until after she had graduated to bring
suit); c.f Amidon v. Michigan, 2008 WL 723536, at *8 (E.D. Mich. March 17,
2008) (plaintiff who chose to voluntarily drop out of school after bringing suit was
required to exhaust administrative remedies for past injuries); Allensworth-
Cannaday v. Windham Exempted Village Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 3129818, at *6
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2007) (exhaustion required despite imminent graduation where
relief remained available and delay was attributable to plaintiff).
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during the fourth grade. The essence of the complaint was that
Charlie's teacher invited her pupils to vent their feelings about
certain topics, which apparently included Charlie, a student with an
IDEA disability. 78  Charlie suffered from, among other things, an
attention deficit disorder and panic attacks. 79 The parents alleged the
teacher's invitation resulted in complaints about Charlie causing him
humiliation, loss of confidence and self-esteem, and disruption of
Charlie's educational progress and even fistfights with other
students. 80  Since, according to the complaint, the genesis of the
problem as well as the consequences occurred in the educational
setting, the court concluded rendition of IDEA services might have
provided a remedy for the injury in the form of counseling and other
related services.81 The court observed the following:
Perhaps Charlie's adverse reaction to the events of
fourth grade cannot be overcome by services available
under the IDEA and the regulations, so that in the end
money is the only balm. But parents cannot know that
without asking, any more than we can... [T]he IDEA
offers comprehensive educational solutions; we
conclude, therefore, that at least in principle relief is
available under the IDEA. 82
Charlie F. may be distinguished from the cases where parties
seek redress for past physical injuries for which IDEA clearly
provides no relief. The physical injury cases are discussed in Part VI,
C below. Nevertheless, Charlie F. may have gone too far in
mandating use of the IDEA administrative process. Although the
conduct complained of arose in an "educational setting," IDEA was
designed for the purpose of furnishing a FAPE via an IEP, to address
students' special needs. It was not established to provide a remedy
for an injury caused by a teacher's independent tort-like treatment of
her, students.
Robb v. Bethel School District, 308 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2002), is
78. See Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 990.
81. Id. at 993.
82. Id.
conceptually similar to Charlie F. and, indeed, relies on that case.
83
There, a student diagnosed with cerebral palsy sued for damages
under section 1983 predicated on violations of IDEA.84  She
claimed, among other things, emotional distress damages and lost
educational opportunities based on her removal from the classroom
in favor of an allegedly deficient, unsupervised peer tutorial
program.85 Since the core of the complaint was based in the delivery
of educational services, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were
required to use IDEA's administrative process before coming to
court. 86 Although damages could be measured by the cost of services
to make the student whole, 87 the administrative process might have
resulted in requiring the LEA to provide such related services as
counseling and psychologist supports and/or educational
interventions in kind under IDEA. Thus, according to the court,
exhaustion might have provided a remedy for the injuries the parents
claimed their child suffered.88 89
3. Renunciation
In Cave v. East Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d at 240
(2d Cir. 2008),90 the parents sued an LEA after their deaf child was
denied entry to a high school and its facilities because he was
accompanied by his service dog. Although the parents claimed
83. Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 308 F.3d 1047, 1052-54 (9th Cir. 2002).
84. Id. at 1048.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1054.
87. Id. at 1050.
88. Robb, 308 F.3d at 1054.
89. In contrast to Charlie F. and Robb, in Covington v. Knox County School
System, 205 F.3d 912, 917 (6th Cir. 2000), the mother brought a claim pursuant to
section 1983, but not IDEA, alleging that school officials had locked her son inside
a small, dark, unheated, unventilated cell for long periods of time as a disciplinary
measure, during the time the student attended special education classes under the
auspices of the LEA. Id. At the time the claim was filed the student had already
graduated from high school. Id. The court concluded that under these "unique
circumstances" exhaustion was excused - the student's injuries were wholly in the
past, and there was no relief that the administrative process could provide him.
Moreover, money damages were the only relief which could make him whole.
90. Cave, 514 F.3d at 240 (2d Cir. 2008).
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violations of ADA, section 504, and section 1983 and renounced any
claim that the student's IEP was deficient,9' the court nevertheless
affirmed the dismissal of the case for want of exhaustion. 92 The court
characterized the complaint as, in substance, seeking a modification
of the IEP,93 since it did not include a service dog. The court
concluded that since the IDEA administrative process could have
provided at least some equitable relief to the plaintiffs which
addressed the facts of which plaintiffs complained,94 IDEA's
exhaustion requirement was applicable. 95 96
4. Removal of the Child from the Public School Program
Parents who have unilaterally removed their children from public
school programs and then sought public benefits to serve the
educational needs of their disabled child in private settings generally
have been unsuccessful in avoiding their obligation to exhaust
IDEA's due process procedures. This result has obtained in private
school,97  home schooling,98  and alternative public school
91. Id. at 247.
92. Id. at 248.
93. Id.
94. Id. Notably the parents in Cave made no allegations of system-wide
IDEA violations, or district-wide policy of discrimination against hearing impaired
students, nor did the parents make a sufficient showing that the superintendent's
recommendation against allowing the dog on the school premises would
contaminate the impartiality of the administrative review process, thereby making
it futile to pursue. Id. at 249-50.
95. Id. at 248-49. The Cave court construed section 1415(1) as sufficiently
broad to encompass complaints asserted under any federal statute, as long as
plaintiffs seek relief available under IDEA. Id. at 248.
96. See also Brandon V. v. Chichester Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 2155722, at 7
(E.D. Pa. July 25, 2007) ("Although Plaintiffs claim to be 'satisfied' with [child's]
current educational programming . . . the administrative process [respecting
plaintiffs § 504 claim] is still valuable, as the IDEA and its implementing
regulations provide a wide range of services that may enable [the child] to
overcome the adverse effects of the abuse he suffered... ").
97. E.g., Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1343 (6th Cir. 1989) (concluding that
the parents' decision to send a child to private school does not excuse their failure
to exhaust administrative remedies).
98. E.g., S.E. v. Grant County Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2008). In
S.E. the court rejected the parents' contention that IDEA's futility exception to the
29-2
placements.99 Where, however, a parent has placed her child in a
private school after exhausting IDEA's due process requirements and
then files a complaint in the district court, she will not be obligated to
re-exhaust those remedies for events arising after the conclusion of
the administrative proceedings, where the factual basis for the new
claim was decided in a previous due process proceeding. 0
5. Section 504 Classified Students Who May Be IDEA Eligible
In Cudjoe v. Independent Sch. Dist., 297 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir.
2002) a student who suffered from Epstein-Barr virus, a disease
which results in debilitating fatigue, participated in a home-bound
instructional program between grades five and eleven, pursuant to a
exhaustion requirement applied when parents elected to home-school their disabled
child. Id. at 642. Although the parents claimed that the school district failed to
implement a section 504 educational plan as written, and further made unilateral
changes to the child's program in violation of the child's due process rights, the
court did not find IDEA remedies futile. Among other reasons it concluded the
administrative process could furnish the compensatory education they sought. Id.
at 642. It seems unsound for courts to require IDEA exhaustion when the parties
have stipulated to the child's classification under another statute such as section
504 since, among other reasons, the court is substituting its judgment for that of the
agency about the nature of the child's disability.
99. E.g., B.H. ex rel. K.H. v. Portage Public Sch. Bd. of Educ., 2009 WL
277051, at *3, 12 (W.D. Mich. February 2, 2009) (".... courts have unanimously
rejected the argument that parents' unilateral decision to remove a child from the
defendant school district [here, to another public school district] renders exhaustion
futile"); R.M. ex rel. R.M. v. Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 5111065, at *2,
*8 n. 4 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 5, 2008), (citing Franklin v. Frid, 7 F. Supp. 2d 920, 924
(W.D. Mich. 1998)) (observing that plaintiffs were bound to follow the
administrative process regardless of whether the disabled student had been
removed by plaintiffs to another public school).
100. See J.P.E.H. v. Hooksett Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 4681827 (D.N.H. Oct. 22,
2008). In JP.E.H., the parent filed for IDEA due process and a final administrative
decision was rendered in May, 2007. Id. at * 1-2. The parent then removed the
child to a private school for school year 2007-2008, and sought reimbursement for
the tuition she incurred for that time period. Id. She alleged in her complaint the
inadequacy of the 2006-2007 program. Id. Since the May, 2007 decision found
the district offered a FAPE for 2006-2007, the court concluded that no purpose
would be served by returning to IDEA due process hearings and for that reason
denied the district's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust. Id. at *3 (citing to
Missouri Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr. and Mrs. R., 321 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir.
2003)).
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section 504 individual accommodation plan (IAP).' 0 ' The student's
IAPs were revised annually at meetings in which the parent
participated. 10 2 The student's instructional program for those years
was comprised of a teacher coming to his home to teach the general
curriculum for his grade level, with the exception of his being
excused from physical education. 03 Significantly, the student had
never been classified under IDEA at any time by the school
district.10 4 The parents brought a lawsuit under section 1983, ADA,
and section 504, among other statutes, but not IDEA.' °5 They alleged
that the teacher selected by the LEA would not meet the student's
educational needs and as a result the parents refused to accept the
district's offer of tutoring and, because the LEA refused to allow the
student to be tutored by a person the parent preferred, he was without
a teacher for his eleventh grade year. 0 6 The parents further alleged
that the district furnished teaching materials in a tardy fashion.10 7
Reading broadly section 1415(l)'s "relief available" provision, the
court concluded that the student might well have been found IDEA
eligible as having an "other health impairment"' 08 had the parent
used the Act's due process tribunals. Since "relief' might have been
"available" under the IDEA administrative process, it was
impermissible for plaintiffs to spurn those procedures at the time of
the injury, and later sue for damages. 10 9
101. Cudjoe v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 297 F.3d 1058, 1061, 1068 (10th Cir. 2002).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1061 n. 5.
104. Id. at 1066, 1068.
105. Id. at 1060.
106. Id. at 1066.
107. Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1066.
108. Id. at 1068.
109. Id. at 1067-68. Cudjoe raises troubling concerns about the extent to
which courts will go to require IDEA exhaustion. Between grades five and eleven
the parents and LEA had stipulated to the fact the student had a section 504
disability and, by inference, not an IDEA disability. Id. at 1060. The LEA should
have been estopped from claiming at this late date that the district court did not
enjoy subject matter jurisdiction based on the parents' failure to exhaust IDEA's
administrative procedures. Moreover, although a federal court may at any time
raise jurisdictional issues, irrespective of whether they are raised by the parties, six
consecutive years of section 504, and not IDEA classification, should have been a
6. The Failure to Request Educational Programming Prior to
Initiation and Exhaustion of IDEA's Due Process Procedures
In Ellenberg v. New Mexico Military Institute, 478 F.3d 1262
(10th Cir. 2007) the parents, anticipating that their daughter would be
discharged from her treatment facility in summer 2003, applied for
her admission to New Mexico Military Institute (NMMI), a publicly
funded school with strict admissions requirements, for fall 2003.10
The parents contended that NMMI was the only appropriate
placement for their daughter. Instead of requesting an amended or
new IEP from the IEP team after her rejection from NMMI,"'1 the
parents proceeded to a Tier I due process hearing and a Tier II
administrative appeal of that decision, but lost at both levels.'1 2 They
then filed claims in the federal district court under IDEA, among
other laws, which granted summary judgment to the defendants. 13
In dismissing the parents' appeal the Tenth Circuit stated:
We hold today that before a party may seek relief in
federal court alleging a violation of the IDEA's
substantive provisions, a party must first request an
IEP for the disabled child, or seek a change to a
current IEP if one exists, from the agency designated
to create that plan under the state's educational
framework. Because it is undisputed that plaintiffs
never attempted to amend their child's existing IEP or
obtain a new IEP before pursuing the IDEA claim,
they have failed to exhaust the IDEA's administrative
procedures and remedies."l 4
Clearly then, the Tenth Circuit sweeps into IDEA section
1415(i)(2)(A), the requirement that the parents request of the LEA,
an IEP, or an amendment to an existing IEP as a predicate for using
jurisdictional fact which outweighed any other considerations in making its
decision.
110. Ellenberg v. New Mexico Military Inst., 478 F.3d 1262, 1271-72 (10th
Cir. 2007).
111. Id. at 1267.
112. Id. at 1273.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1267.
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the state's due process apparatus, unless an exception to the rule
applies. 115 116
7. Allegations of Unlawful Policies Where Student Litigant Seeks
Individual Relief Only
The Tenth Circuit recently held in McQueen ex rel. McQueen v.
Colorado Springs Sch. Dist., 488 F.3d 868 (10th Cir. 2007) that the
parents of an autistic child were required to exhaust IDEA's
administrative remedies, notwithstanding their allegations that the
LEA, following SEA guidelines, maintained a policy which violated
IDEA, since it limited extended-school year services (ESY) to only
those services which were necessary to maintain previously learned
skills. In McQueen the parents sought, among other things,
reimbursement for their purchase of summer services for their child.
117 The court observed that the parents' claim was grounded in a
single component of the Colorado Department of Education's (CDE)
educational program, that is, the effects of its ESY policy on IEPs.
Because there was no factual record concerning the student's
particular needs, the court asserted it was in no position to ascertain
115. Ellenberg is disturbing in that for all intents and purposes the parents
exhausted their remedies provided in section 1415. There is a case to be made that
under these circumstances it was the federal court's duty to decide the merits of the
case. By adding procedures not contained in IDEA's exhaustion provision, the
Tenth Circuit may have expanded section 1415's exhaustion requirements beyond
what Congress intended, and thereby unnecessarily burdened the parents' access to
the courts.
116. In El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R., 567 F. Supp. 2d 918 (W.D.
Tex. 2008), the parents had prevailed in a state level one-tier system due process
hearing, and the LEA appealed that decision in court. The LEA contended that
because the parents refused to participate in a so-called Student Teacher
Assessment Team (STAT) before or after initiating due process procedures, they
failed to satisfy IDEA's exhaustion requirement. Id. at 937-40. In rejecting this
argument the court stated it found nothing in the IDEA or Texas law requiring use
of STAT in order to gain access to the courts. The El Paso court expressly refused
to apply Ellenberg's "expansive holding" to the facts of the case, observing that
under the LEA's argument new procedural requirements not contained in the Act
would be required. Id. at 939. Instead, it applied the law of the circuit Gardner v.
Sch. Bd. Caddo Parish, 958 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1992), allowing access to the courts
based on literal adherence to IDEA's exhaustion requirements. Id. at 938.
117. McQueen ex rel. McQueen v. Colorado Springs Sch. Dist., 488 F.3d 868
(10th Cir. 2007).
the effects of that policy on this student's receipt of a FAPE.1 18 Since
it was not clear that the due process procedures would be unable to
provide the FAPE to which this student was entitled, futility was not
established. 119 120 121
The nature of the relief sought by the plaintiffs is critical in
118. Id. at 875.
119. The court also rejected the parents' argument that because they were
challenging a "policy or practice of general applicability" exhaustion must be
excused. Id. at 875-76. Notwithstanding the fact that the parents challenged
facially, a policy which prevented teaching children new skills in ESY program, the
issue here was whether the student received a FAPE and whether the parents were
entitled under IDEA to reimbursement. Id. at 875-76. Therefore, the general
applicability exception to the exhaustion requirement did not apply. Finally, the
court observed that exhaustion may be excused where plaintiffs allege structural or
systemic failures and seek system-wide reform, but this was not such a case. Id. at
874-75.
120. See Fraser v. Tamalpais Union Sch. Dist., 281 F. App'x. 746, (9th Cir.
2008); Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Pa. 2008);
Gardner v. Sch. Bd. of Caddo Parish, 958 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 2002). In Fraser, the
parents argued that the district had a policy of intentionally misinforming or failing
to inform parents and students about section 504 accommodations. Fraser, 281 F.
App'x at 748. The court held that exhaustion was still required, to give the agency
an opportunity to correct the allegedly systemic failure. Id. In Blunt, the court
rejected multiple sets of parents' complaints that exhaustion should be excused on
the ground of futility. The court stated, "Allowing plaintiffs to bypass the
administrative process by merely including conclusory allegations of systemic
deficiencies would permit the exception to the exhaustion requirement to swallow
the rule." Id. at 559. In Gardner, the parents commenced an action in court,
contending the district's policy of limiting tape recordings of IEP meetings violated
IDEA. Gardner, 958 F.2d at 109-10. The court concluded the complaint was
subject to IDEA's exhaustion strictures since it fell within the scope of IEP matters.
Id. at 111-12 (stating that even if Tier I review might be futile, parents did not
allege Tier II review could not correct the error).
121. In A.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 548 F. Supp. 2d 219
(E.D. Va. 2008), the parents sought relief under ADA and section 504, but not
IDEA, related to the student's suspension in a direct judicial action, in which they
sought "a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and monetary damages on the
basis of alleged disparate discipline of disabled students by the School Board." Id.
at 221. The parents argued that exhaustion was not required since they alleged
constitutional due process violations and sought money damages. Therefore, relief
was unavailable in IDEA proceedings. Id. at 223. The court, in rejecting the
parents' position, invoked IDEA's section 1415, noting that since July 1, 2005
IDEA's due process procedures included provision for student suspensions. This
made relief available to the plaintiff under IDEA. Id. at 223.
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determining whether a court will characterize the violations alleged
under the Act as systemic. Waters v. South Bend Comty. Sch. Corp.,
1999 WL 528173, 191 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 1999) (table decision),
illustrates this point. In Waters, the plaintiff claimed that since the
LEA systemically failed to identify students with learning
disabilities, relief could not be obtained through the Act's
administrative process. In rejecting that assertion the court stated:
Even if we assume that Mr. Waters is claiming that the
underlying causes of his failure to receive a sufficient
education involve the systemic failure to identify
disabled students, the remedy he seeks is an individual
remedy to make himself whole. He does not seek relief
that requires restructuring, by judicial order, of the
mechanism that the state has in place to meet the needs
of students with special educational problems. Nor
does he allege that he effectively has been deprived of
an administrative forum. The individual-specific relief
that he ultimately seeks may be granted through the
administrative process (internal citation omitted).122
Further, whether relief is "systemic" for exhaustion purposes
based on allegations that state policy violates IDEA is highly fact
dependent. Where there is no factual dispute and the outcome of the
case turns on whether the state policy is unlawful, no exhaustion
should be required, since the issue is one of law and not within the
agency's expertise. 23 By contrast, as in McQueen and Waters,
where the individual needs of the child were in dispute, a court could
benefit from application of administrative expertise to the facts,
exhaustion should be required before judicial review is sought.
8. Claims of Insufficient Notice from the Agency Concerning the
Exhaustion Requirement
Some parents have attempted to gain access to the courts on the
ground that the information the LEA or SEA provided to them was
insufficient to inform them of their obligation to exhaust. This
122. Waters v. S. Bend Cmty Sch. Corp., 1999 WL 528173, 191 F.3d 457 (7th
Cir. 1999) (table decision).
123. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 193, 193-98 (1969) (discussing
pure law exception to administrative exhaustion).
argument has been rejected where the court finds the notice to have
been adequate to apprise parents of their rights. 124
9. Issue Exhaustion
Courts generally will dismiss issues not fully exhausted
administratively, even where exhaustion of other issues has
occurred.1 25  Recently, in Loch v. Board of Education of
Edwardsville, 573 F. Supp.2d 1072 (S.D. Ill. 2008) the court
dismissed, for want of exhaustion, the parents' claim concerning the
adequacy and completeness of the student's evaluation on the ground
that they had failed to raise that particular issue during IDEA's
mandated due process procedures, although they did raise the issue of
"[w]hether the district's review and determination of eligibility
[were] correct.' ' 126 This failure barred the parents from arguing the
evaluation issue to the court.127  In J. W ex rel. J.E. W. v. Fresno
124. See, e.g., Papania-Jones v. Dupree, 275 F. App'x 301, 303 (5th Cir.
2008) (rejecting argument that language in state notice informing parents that they
may initiate a due process proceeding was inadequate to inform them that IDEA
exhaustion was required as a condition of gaining access to the courts); MM ex rel
DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County, 303 F.3d 523, 535-36 (4th Cir. 2002)
(recognizing school board's failure to give parents proper notification of their
administrative rights as an exemption to the exhaustion requirement, but requiring
exhaustion, upon a finding that these parents were sufficiently informed of the
obligation, based on their having challenged other IEPs); Levine v. Greece Cent.
Sch. Dist., No. 08-CV-6072, 2009 WL 261470, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2009)
(finding district was under no obligation to advise plaintiff that administrative
remedies must be exhausted before filing suit, where plaintiff admitted receiving
standard state notice of procedural rights).
125. See, e.g., Wooley v. Valley Ctr.-Pauma Unified Sch. Dist., No.
07cv0675, 2007 WL 2023525, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. July 11, 2007) (finding failure to
exhaust issues contained in due process request, which the parents withdrew after
the balance of their claim was dismissed administratively); and Hesling v. Avon
Grove Sch. Dist., 428 F. Supp. 2d 262, 275-76 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (explaining the
problem of piecemeal litigation).
126. Loch v. Bd. of Educ. of Edwardsville, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1073, 1078-
79 (S.D. I11. 2008). In Loch the parents and LEA had stipulated to a list of issues
the hearing officer would decide. The list was later expanded over the objection of
the LEA. The amended list did not, however, include the specific allegation that
the district had failed to adequately and completely evaluate the student in accord
with IDEA mandates. Id. at 1078-79.
127. Id. at 1081-82.
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Unified School District, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (E.D. Cal. 2008), the
court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
where the plaintiff asserted that the school district had failed to
produce the specific records he requested 28 and challenged the
qualifications of the hearing officer who presided at the due process
proceedings, but failed to raise these issues in the prior administrative
proceedings. 2 9 130 131
A case concluding that the issues were adequately exhausted is
H.B. v. Las Virgenes Unified School District, 239 F. App'x 342 (9th
Cir. 2007).132 There the court held that the parent had exhausted
administrative remedies under IDEA on the issue of whether the LEA
had predetermined a child's IEP in advance of the IEP meeting. In
H.B. the administrative hearing officer refused to evaluate that issue
because the parents had failed to identify it in their complaint or at
the beginning of the hearing. Nevertheless, both sides questioned
128. J.W. ex rel J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1212,
1213, 1220 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
129. Indeed, Cal. Gov. Code § 11425.40(d) (Deering 1997 & Supp. 2009);
Cal. Code of Regs. tit. 1 §§ 1034(a)-(b) (2009) expressly gave the right to plaintiff
to exercise a preemptory challenge to replace an assigned administrative law judge.
See J.W., 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1221. Even if this express right did not exist under
California law it seems likely that the complaint would have been dismissed
anyway, for failure to exhaust these issues.
130. See also A.E. v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 251 F. App'x 685, 687 (2d Cir.
2007) (holding that plaintiffs waived their procedural challenges to the IEP
meetings by failing to raise those challenges either prior to or during the due
process hearing); Stanley C. v. M.S.D., 2008 WL 5423486, at *70 (N.D. Ind. Dec.
29, 2008) (holding that where Tier I hearing officer refused parents' request to
entertain claims respecting school year 2006-2007 in proceeding reviewing 2005-
2006 and 2004-2005 issues, and parents failed to seek review of that decision at
Tier II, parents were barred from seeking judicial review of the adverse decision in
court for failure to exhaust administrative remedies on that issue); Neena S. v. The
Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 05-5404, 2008 WL 5273546, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19,
2008) (holding that where parents' complaint sought compensatory education
award for period including February 10, 1998 through the 2001-2002 school year,
but only appealed restrictions on the Tier I award to Tier II hearing panel, parents
could not litigate in court the denial of compensatory education they sought, for
failure to exhaust).
131. There is no IDEA statutory or regulatory requirement addressing issue
exhaustion.
132. H.B. v. Las Virgenes Unified Sch. Dist., 239 F. App'x 342 (9th Cir.
2007).
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witnesses on the predetermination issue and submitted arguments
about it in their closing briefs. Since the hearing officer had a "clear
opportunity" to rule on the issue, the Ninth Circuit considered it
sufficiently exhausted to establish the right to judicial review of that
issue. 133 134
Finally, a procedural deficiency similar to failure to exhaust
issues is failure to join parties. For example, in Horen v. Board of
Education of Toledo School District, 568 F. Supp. 2d 850 (N.D. Ohio
2008) the court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction against the Ohio Department of Education where the
parents first introduced a complaint against the Department during
their Tier II appeal of the due process hearing officer's Tier I
decision. 135 This denied the Department the opportunity to remedy
any claim against it by not including it in the initial dispute, or
bringing a separate due process claim against the Department.
10. Assertion of Claims in Court, Arising Subsequent to IDEA Due
Process Proceedings
Plaintiffs may not seek to litigate claims in court that arose
subsequent to the time period at issue in the underlying
administrative proceeding.' 36 This rule should not prevent a party
133. Id. at 344.
134. Brenneise v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 4853329 (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 7, 2008) is another case where issue exhaustion was deemed adequate. There,
the parents contended that two IEPs failed to provide for fceding of the child by a
registered nurse, through a gastrostomy tube, in violation of IDEA.
Notwithstanding the district's claim to the contrary, the administrative record
revealed that this issue was presented by the parents both at the due process hearing
and in the decision by the Office of Administrative Hearings. Id. at *8-9.
135. Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of Toledo Sch. Dist., 568 F. Supp. 2d 850, 852,
857 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
136. See, e.g., Metro. Bd. of Public Educ. v. Guest, 193 F.3d 457, 463 (6th
Cir. 1999) (court exceeded its jurisdiction to the extent it ruled on later proposed
IEP issues for subsequent school years not at issue in administrative proceeding);
Jeremy H. v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1996) (claims
arising after conclusion of the administrative hearing and claims not raised in that
hearing must be exhausted, and cannot be raised in due process appeal); Brennan v.
Reg'l Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 531 F. Supp. 2d 245, 263-64 (D. Conn. 2008)
(dismissing claims relating to school year subsequent to the filing of the due
process complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and finding them to be
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who initiates a due process proceeding from initiating another due
process proceeding relative to events which arise later, and then
moving before the hearing officer entertaining the first case to
consolidate the second case into the first. This would serve the
purposes of judicial efficiency, and make more likely that final orders
are consistent with one another. 13
7
11. Attempted Enforcement in Federal Court of Settlement
Agreements Entered into Outside of the Resolution Session, or
Before Due Process Tribunals.
The only express provision in IDEA which permits judicial
enforcement of written settlement agreements addresses those
agreements achieved during the mandatory resolution sessions held
prior to commencement of the due process proceeding. Federal
courts have utilized this provision to dismiss enforcement actions
where settlements were achieved prior to commencement of the due
process hearing, and outside an IDEA resolution session.
138 139 140
premature; commenting that parents should have brought a separate administrative
proceeding respecting the later events).
137. See, e.g., N.N.J. v. Broward County Sch. Bd., 2007 WL 3120299, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2007) (noting that the pro se parent's six due process cases filed
under IDEA had been consolidated by the hearing officer, with 26 days of hearing).
138. See notes 27 and 28 and accompanying text (discussing provision).
139. In J.M.C. ex rel. E.G.C. v. La Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Ed., 584
F. Supp. 2d 894, 897-98 (M.D. La. 2008), the court found the LEA had timely held
a preliminary meeting but reached a settlement with the parent after that meeting
but before the hearing was scheduled to begin. The court expressly declined to
interpret Congress's intent, and dismissed the complaint based on failure to
exhaust. The court determined it did not have jurisdiction because IDEA, by its
terms - 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii) (2006), makes enforceable in court,
agreements reached "at" the preliminary [resolution] meeting. This case was
probably correctly decided, since IDEA does not create the jurisdictional predicate
for stipulations of settlement under these circumstances.
140. See, e.g., Pope ex rel. Pope v. Cherokee County Bd. of Educ., 562 F.
Supp. 2d 1371, 1374, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (dismissing case on ground of
plaintiffs failure to exhaust administrative remedies where parents alleged
defendants breached the 2.5 year old settlement agreement requiring the district to
provide sufficient training to staff members); W.L.G. ex rel. Nora Riley v. Houston
County Bd. of Educ., 975 F. Supp. 1317, 1328-29 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (holding, "A
post-settlement enforcement claim should be exhausted, in the same manner as are
all other [IDEA] claims ... ", and suggesting the court would then consider "the
VI. RELATIONSHIP OF IDEA DUE PROCESS EXHAUSTION PROCEDURES
AND THE STATE COMPLAINT PROCEDURE/CRP
School districts and SEAs have sometimes contended that
exhaustion of the state complaint/CRP, in addition to due process, is
required before seeking judicial review. Such claims have been
fairly uniformly rebuffed by the courts, principally on the ground that
Congress did not intend to allow states to add exhaustion
requirements not identified in the statute.'41 Thus, parents' use of
state complaint procedures/CRP is purely elective, and cannot be
used to thwart parental access to the courts once administrative
exhaustion is completed or rendered futile or inadequate.' 42
Moreover, parents will not be successful where they argue that their
use of state complaint procedures, per se, is an adequate substitute
for exhaustion of IDEA due process procedures.' 43 There may,
changed or subsequent circumstances as only incident to a current, viable and
already exhausted IDEA claim").
141. E.g., Porter v. Bd. of Trustees of Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist.,
307 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1194 (2003) (rejecting
argument that parents who obtained a final order of a state special education
agency under IDEA's due process mechanism must further exhaust CRP before
bringing an enforcement proceeding in federal court); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d
748 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting defendant's assertion that CRP must be exhausted
prior to bringing a § 1983 action to enforce EAHA, IDEA's predecessor, noting
that EAHA section 1415 does not directly, or by its legislative history, suggest that
once CRP is invoked, it must be exhausted prior to commencing an enforcement
action); Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 274 (3d Cir. 1996)
(refusing to require exhaustion of CRP in judicial proceeding to enforce decision of
due process hearing officer, that LEA refused to implement); Radcliffe v. Sch. Bd.,
38 F. Supp. 2d 994 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (same, but observing that state complaint/CRP
may adequately substitute for due process).
142. Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, 307 F.3d at 1072 (further observing the United
States Department of Education has never interpreted its CRP regulations as
creating a mandatory step before suit alleging an IDEA violation). See also,
Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 641 (2d Cir. 1988) (courts may not add steps
to IDEA exhaustion not contemplated in the Act by sua sponte review of
unappealed due process decisions, since such activity by the courts is not consistent
with Congressional intent); Diamond v. McKenzie, 602 F. Supp. 632, 639 (D.D.C.
1985) (holding that state may not subject children and their parents to additional
steps not required by EAHA).
143. See Webster v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 212 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 2000)
(utilizing the state complaint procedures does not satisfy IDEA's exhaustion
requirement); Levine v. Greece Central Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 261470, at *5
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however, be situations where CRP exhaustion serves as a substitute
for due process exhaustion, where resort to due process would be
futile or inadequate. 1" Finally, there is some controversy over
whether final CRP decisions are reviewable in court.1 45
VII. WHEN IDEA EXHAUSTION IS EXCUSED
A threshold question in exhaustion disputes is whether or not a
claimed right, anchored in the IDEA, actually exists. This seemingly
simple question can be quite difficult to resolve. The Second
Circuit's decision in Coleman v. Newburg Enlarged City Sch. Dist.,
503 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2007), illustrates this issue. 146 In Coleman,
plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction ordering a disabled
student's reinstatement from suspension and assignment to an interim
alternative educational setting (IAES) during the pendency of an
administrative appeal from the determination that the student's
misconduct was not a manifestation of his disability. 147 Plaintiffs
claimed that as a result of the erroneous suspension the student would
not graduate on time, or be able to participate in extracurricular
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2009); J.M.C. ex rel E.G.C. v. La. Bd. of Elementary and
Secondary Ed., 562 F. Supp. 2d 748, 755-56 (M.D. La. 2008) (state complaint
procedure for resolving disputes under IDEA, being different in purpose and scope
and procedure from IDEA due process hearing, is insufficient to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement of IDEA).
144. E.g., Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1275-76 (9th Cir.
1999) (where all educational issues are resolved in CRP, leaving only issues for
which there is no adequate administrative remedy, due process exhaustion is not
required).
145. See Christopher S. v. Stanislaus County Office of Educ., 384 F.3d 1205
(9th Cir. 2004); and S.A. v. Tulare County Office of Educ., 2009 WL 30298 (E.D.
Cal. Jan. 6, 2009) (both concluding that CRP decisions are subject to judicial
review); but see, Va. Office of Prot. and Advocacy v. Va. Dep't of Educ., 262 F.
Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. Va. 2003) (concluding that because IDEA's § 1415 creates a
cause of action after due process procedures are completed, but does not do so for
CRP, there is no private right of action for review of CRP decisions);
Wachlarowicz v. Sch. Bd. of Independent Sc. Dist. No. 832, 40 IDELR 209 (D.
Minn. August 1, 2003) (same). See also Part VIII hereof (discussing legislative
amendment to eliminate uncertainty).
146. Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 503 F.3d 198 (2d Cir.
2007).
147. Id. at 202.
activities. 4 8 The court framed the issue as "whether he had a right,
under the IDEA, to be reinstated at [his home school] while the
allegedly erroneous manifestation determination was reviewed."' 4 9 It
concluded that IDEA created neither a right to such reinstatement nor
to graduate on a date certain or from a particular educational
institution. 5 ° Since the claimed rights did not exist, they could not
be frustrated by the administrative process. 5  "In sum, while
Coleman had a right not to be removed from [his home school] based
on an erroneous determination of no manifestation, he had no right to
reinstatement while that determination was being reviewed
[administratively].' 5 2
Moreover, this question must be resolved whether the complaint
is brought directly under IDEA, section 504, ADA, or other federal
statutes protecting children with disabilities. It requires a detailed
examination of the Act's purposes and precise language.'53 If the
answer is "no, it does not exist," then the next question - whether
relief is "available" - for the complainant under the Act - becomes
irrelevant for purposes of an exhaustion inquiry. If the answer is
"yes, an IDEA-based right exists," the threshold query should help
ascertain the nature of IDEA relief which might be "available" a
declaration, an order for future conduct, reimbursement,
compensatory education, payment for IEE, reformation of the IEP,
rescission of a diploma, for example, for the conduct of which
plaintiff complains.
Upon ascertaining that an IDEA right exists, that such right may
have been violated by defendant's conduct, and what can be the
IDEA "relief available," the court will know whether exhaustion is
required. If the overlap between the right and the claim is sufficient,
plaintiff must exhaust IDEA's due process mechanism, even if it
does not provide the relief plaintiff would prefer for the alleged
violation(s). Once the court determines that IDEA requires
exhaustion of a particular claim, it must then consider whether
148. Id.
149. Id. at 205.
150. Id. at 205-206.
151. Id. at 206.
152. Coleman, 503 F.3d at 205.
153. Id.
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exhaustion is excused, at least where plaintiff has raised that
argument.
This Part examines cases in which courts have excused IDEA
exhaustion and places them into categories arising in IDEA litigation.
Although they overlap conceptually, they form concrete reference
points for understanding what futility and inadequacy mean in the
IDEA administrative scheme. Where appropriate, cases requiring
exhaustion within these categories are included. These categories
include the following: the agency's failure to implement
unambiguous IEP requirements; enforcement of final due process
hearing orders; monetary damages for past physical injuries; the
agency's denial of access to the IDEA's due process procedures; the
emergency situation exception; untimely due process decisions;
status quo or pendency of placement violations; the class action;
retaliation for exercise of protected rights; the absence of an IDEA
administrative forum to adjudicate the dispute; failure of the SEA to
adequately implement IDEA required policies and procedures;
parents' independent rights, or lack thereof; parental refusal of the
IDEA classification and services exception; and non-FAPE
programming and services exception. Each of these categories will
be examined in turn.
A. The Agency's Failure to Implement Services that were Specified
or Otherwise Clearly Stated in the IEP.
Often, looking to the IDEA's legislative history, courts have
grappled with the issue of whether an agency's failure to implement
IEP programs and services excused the IDEA's exhaustion
requirements. Their conclusions rest mostly on how specific, or
unambiguous, the IEP entries are.154  This ground for exhaustion
154. Compare, e.g., Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 489-90 (2d Cir.
2002) (recognizing excusal based on legislative history for IEP implementation
failures, but finding Polera's IEPs to lack specificity, with "long lists of abstract
goals" and virtual silence as to materials or services and, therefore, "not the sort of
case described by Senator Simon, in which a school failed to implement specified
or clearly stated IEP services") with Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 158 n. 11 (2d
Cir. 1992) (quoting Senator Paul Simon, co-sponsor of the 1975 and 1986 Acts
from the congressional record at 131 Cong. Rec. 21392-93 (1985), to the effect that
IDEA exhaustion is not required where an agency has failed to provide services in
the child's IEP); Valentino C. v. Sch. Dist., 2004 WL 225038 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3,
29-2
excusal has been extended to failure to fund cases as well.1 55
Courts have not, however, been uniform in their willingness to
excuse exhaustion based on IEP implementation failures, and this
proposition is not free from doubt.' 56 157 Before concluding that
2004) (relying on legislative history to excuse exhaustion when plaintiffs alleged
district failed to implement IEP); Irene B. v. Phila. Acad. Charter Sch., 2003 WL
24052009 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2003) (applying futility exception in action against
charter schools for failure to comply with old IEP or develop new one; noting
absence of damages remedy under IDEA and legislative history relating to
excusing exhaustion for disputes over implementation of IEP); Joseph M. v. Se.
Delco Sch. Dist., 2001 WL 283154 (E.D. Pa. March 19,2001) (not requiring
exhaustion in dispute over failure to provide placement recommended in IEP;
relying on legislative history); O.F. v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., 2000 WL 424276
(E.D. Pa. April 19, 2000) (applying futility exception when allegations made that
defendant failed to comply with IEP by not placing the student in an appropriate
school and there was a sufficient factual record to determine what level of care he
required).
155. See, e.g., Kerr Ctr. Parents Ass'n v. Charles, 897 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir.
1990) (futility of exhaustion found in case over funding of education of children in
intermediate care facility); Petties v. Dist. of Columbia, 881 F. Supp. 63 (D.D.C.
1995) (granting preliminary injunction when District of Columbia failed to pay for
private school placements it had made for children with disabilities).
156. See, e.g., Papania-Jones v. Dupree, 275 F. App'x. 301, 303 (5th Cir.
2008) (dismissing complaint alleging failure to deliver IDEA required occupational
therapy services for failure to state a claim, concluding that "[e]ven if [plaintiffs]
could prove that a portion of the required administrative review would be futile, i.e.
the due process hearing, they must prove that an appeal of the hearing to the state
administrative agency would be futile as well"); Andrew M. v. Del. County Office
of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 2005 WL 18000 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2005)
(dismissing, on exhaustion grounds, claims for compensatory education for failure
to provide hours of services called for on individualized family service plans);
Bishop v. Martin County Sch. Bd., 41 IDELR 177 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (dismissing
claim based on implementation, rather than content, of educational program,
despite futility argument); Fliess v. Washoe County, 38 IDELR 67 (D. Nev. 2002)
(requiring exhaustion of damages claim when school district allegedly failed to
follow IEP by having police handcuff and issue citation to child after child hit
teacher), afid, 90 F. App'x 240 (9th Cir. 2004); Rabideau v. Beekmantown Cent.
Sch. Dist., 89 F. Supp. 2d 263 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing on exhaustion grounds
when IEP was ignored or altered and child put in new placement without official
notice but parents had actual notice after the fact and did not object).
157. For discussion concerning the yardstick by which IEP implementation
failures are measured, see Elexis Reed, The Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act - - Ninth Circuit Determines that Only a Material Failure to Implement an
Individualized Educational Program Violates the Individuals with Disabilities
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exhaustion is excused, close scrutiny of the claim is required.' 58
Where plaintiff's claim "unavoidably encompasses both a failure to
provide services and a significant underlying failure to specify what
services were to be provided," exhaustion may not be avoided. '15 9
B. Enforcement of Final Due Process Hearing Orders.
IDEA requires implementation of the final due process decisions
favorable to the parents.' 60 161 A problem concerning enforcement
Education Act. 61 SMU. L. REv. 495 (2008) (reviewing recent circuit cases on this
point).
158. See, e.g., Gardner v. Uniondale Pub. Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 4682442, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2008). In Gardner, the parent alleged the district's failure to
enforce, on one occasion, that part of the child's IEP calling for her to have
unlimited access to the restroom. Since the claim for § 504 damages arose from the
same operative facts as the IDEA complaint, IDEA exhaustion was required.
Moreover, the court concluded that a singular failure to comply with an IEP
provision was not an implementation failure within the futility exception. Finally,
the court assumed, arguendo, that even if the failure was one of IEP
implementation, the allegations did not relate solely to one of implementation, in
that they revealed potential deficiencies in the plan itself, including the lack of
specificity as to how compliance with the plan would be ensured. Id. at * 10-11.
159. Polera, 288 F.2d at 489; see also, e.g., R.M. ex rel. R.M. v. Waukee
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 5111065 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 5, 2008) (looking to the
original rather than the amended complaint, finding a FAPE denial allegation and
directing the parties to brief reasons why the case should not be dismissed for
failure to exhaust, inasmuch as the parents' due process and equal protection claims
were based on excessive use of time outs, the same conduct as gave rise to their
IDEA claims).
160. See, e.g., Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 279 n. 13
(3d Cir. 1996) (observing that it would be "curious" for Congress to have
developed these elaborate procedures merely to produce advisory opinions, but
explicitly leaving open the question of whether IDEA grants jurisdiction to a
district court to enforce a hearing officer's decision ); Robinson v. Pinderhughes,
810 F.2d 1270, 1274 (4th Cir. 1987) ("While the existence of a wrong without a
remedy is not itself a reason for the application of section 1983, the existence of
such a state of affairs enters into our reasoning in finding that the city has .
violated [EAHA]").
161. Although Jeremy H. held that hearing officer's orders could be enforced
pursuant to section 1983, that is no longer the case, at least in the Third Circuit.
See A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791 (2007) (holding that plaintiffs
may not enforce IDEA claims via § 1983). The question of whether final orders
emanating from the IDEA due process mechanism are enforceable under IDEA, §
1983 or under neither statute is troublesome. See James S. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.,
arises because IDEA confers jurisdiction on the federal court to a
party aggrieved by final Tier I or where applicable, Tier II order.' 62
Since the prevailing party is not "aggrieved," the jurisdiction-giving
language in section 1415(i)(2) would seem to preclude an IDEA
enforcement cause of action. 63 It would make no sense to require
parents to re-exhaust those remedies to enforce a favorable decision,
since due process hearing officers do not enjoy subject matter
jurisdiction to enforce their own orders. 64
Although sometimes relying on different authority, courts have
been fairly uniform in excusing exhaustion of the IDEA's
administrative remedies to enforce a favorable hearing decision. 65
559 F. Supp. 2d 600, 614-15 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (commenting that because the order is
binding does not mean that the district court has jurisdiction to enforce it, and
finding the factual allegations too speculative to reach the question of IDEA
jurisdiction).
162. See IDEA § 1415(i)(2) (granting access to the federal courts to persons
"aggrieved by the findings and decision")
163. The counter argument is that where an LEA fails to comply with the final
order plaintiff is aggrieved by the fact that it contained no enforcement mechanism.
See Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d at 278 n. 10 (discussing
issue).
164. E.g., Porter v. Bd. of Trs. of Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 307
F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002); Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist.,
223 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1140 (2002).
165. E.g., Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1274-75 (4th Cir. 1987)
(holding that parent had right to bring section 1983 action, but not an action under
EAHA, to enforce federal substantive rights established by a final decision under
EAHA's administrative scheme, where school district failed to give effect to that
decision); Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108 (1st Cir. 2003)
(permitting non-section 1983 IDEA action to enforce due process hearing decision
without further exhaustion); Porter v. Bd. of Trs., 307 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir.
2002) (reaching same result on basis of IDEA; noting futility and stating
"Requiring exhaustion of California's [complaint resolution process] to file suit
based on a failure to implement an unappealed administrative order would add an
additional step of administrative exhaustion not contemplated by the IDEA");
Brenneise v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 4853329 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7,
2008) (holding that plaintiffs were not required to exhaustion IDEA administrative
procedures before suing the district under section 504 and ADA based on district's
alleged failure to implement a final due process decision); A.V. ex rel. B.V. v.
Burlington Township Bd. of Educ., 2007 WL 1892469, at * 14-16 (D. N.J. June 7,
2007) (in action brought under IDEA, on plaintiff s motion unopposed as to failure
to implement the IEP, finding for plaintiff and ordering steps toward compliance
with ALJ order); Olson v. Robbinsdale Area Schs., 2004 WL 1212081 (D. Minn.
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Notwithstanding this general rule, a plaintiff who obtains a favorable
result at due process may be required to return to the administrative
forum, where the nature of the due process decision contemplated
further proceedings of the IEP team.' 66 Moreover, where parties
have entered into stipulations of settlement which have been "so
ordered" by an IDEA hearing officer, courts have excused exhaustion
on the ground of futility in actions to enforce those orders.167
C. Monetary Damages for Past Physical Injuries by School Officials.
Courts sometimes have excused IDEA exhaustion where the
complaint alleges infliction of severe physical and/or mental injuries,
for which IDEA does not provide a remedy.
In a Ninth Circuit case, Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d
1271 (9th Cir. 1999), plaintiffs alleged substantial physical and
verbal abuse by a teacher and an instructional assistant against their
son, a child suffering from among other things, Tourette's
Syndrome. 168 The court excused exhaustion on the ground that the
May 28, 2004) (applying Section 1983 and entering preliminary injunction to
require district to permit child to participate in graduation in accordance with
hearing officer order); SJB v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2004 WL 1586500
(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (not requiring further exhaustion in IDEA action over
failure to implement hearing officer decision); R.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of
City of New York, 99 F. Supp. 2d 411, 415-416 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding no
requirement to exhaust IDEA procedures in action to enforce brought under IDEA,
section 1983, ADA, and section 504).
166. E.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Glens Falls Common Sch. Dist., 488
F. Supp. 2d 202, 207-208 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding no futility excusing exhaustion
where parents alleged that defendant failed to comply with review officer's order
that required reevaluation of child and determination whether child should continue
to be classified as child with disability since order did not provide specific plan to
implement or identify specific services to be provided or goals to be achieved).
167. E.g., Eddins v. Excelsior Indep. Sch. Dist., 1997 WL 470353, at *6-7, 9-
11 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (excusing any further exhaustion in a § 1983 action but
dismissing several additional claims, including jurisdiction under IDEA, for want
of exhaustion) (magistrate's recommendation); cf Woods ex rel. T.W. v. N. J.
Dep't of Educ., 796 F. Supp. 767, 775 (D. N.J. 1992) (finding IDEA jurisdiction
where AU approved stipulation of settlement); see, generally, Morton Denlow,
Federal Jurisdiction in the Enforcement of Settlement Agreements: Kokkonen
Revisited, 2003 FED. CTS. L. REv. 3 (2003).
168. Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1275-76 (9th Cir.
1999). The plaintiff in Witte was a ten-year-old who alleged he had been tortured
parties had resolved the educationally-related issues through the IEP
process, and sought only monetary damages for past physical
injuries, relief not available under IDEA.
In Padilla v. School Dist. No. 1 City and County of Denver, 233
F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000) a similar result obtained. 169 There, the
court excused IDEA exhaustion when the parents sued under ADA
and IDEA on behalf of an IDEA-eligible child, seeking only
damages.1 70  They sought redress for the fractured skull and other
physical injuries, including an exacerbation of her seizure disorder,
their daughter suffered, allegedly as the result of the school district's
and its board's ADA violations, including placing her in an
unsupervised, windowless closet.17' Since the parents did not
complain about the child's current educational program, and indeed
attested to the program's adequacy, the court saw no need to require
exhaustion, particularly because of the IDEA's emphasis in
furnishing prospective educational benefits and the unavailability of
damages under the Act. 1
72
by two teachers because of his illness. He had been: force-fed oatmeal, even though
he was allergic to it; strangled so badly he had to be taken to the emergency room;
tackled and held to the ground repeatedly; made to run on a treadmill set at high
speed with weights strapped to his ankles; deprived of meals; sprayed in the face
with water; and forced to stay outside without food or water. Id. at 1273. Neither
the source nor the nature of the plaintiffs alleged injuries was educational. "The
foregoing abuses were inflicted on Plaintiff for making noise in the classroom, not
running fast enough, not staying on task, not cutting his food, and making
involuntary body movements. All these actions are characteristics of Plaintiffs
disabilities and occurred because of his disabilities." Id.
169. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 City and County of Denver, 233 F.3d 1268
(10th Cir. 2000).
170. Id. at 1275.
171. Id. at 1274.
172. Id. at 1274-75. For a case holding that exhaustion was required after the
use of physical restraint on an autistic child, see Pope v. Cherokee County Bd. of
Educ., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1375-76 (N.D. Ga. 2006). In Pope, the parents
brought a direct claim under IDEA alleging that the district and its employees
failed and refused to properly train staff members who supervised their autistic
child in an after-school program. Id. The complaint alleged that on one occasion
four female defendants piled on top of the student to restrain him from acts of
aggression and another where an officer who was called to the scene handcuffed
the student's hands behind his back. The plaintiffs asserted these incidents resulted
in educational and social set-backs for the child which the court described as a
"temporary regression." Id. The court concluded that even if the current
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In a Seventh Circuit case, 173 parents of an IDEA-eligible child
afflicted with muscular dystrophy brought a section 1983 claim
alleging their child was subjected to physical abuse at school, leading
to severe kidney damage that permanently reduced the child's quality
of life.' 74 Since these injuries were physical, not educational, the
court concluded they fell outside the scope of IDEA, and exhaustion
was excused. 175 176
educational plan was sufficient, the basic dispute was still about a failure to provide
public education to an autistic child and the adverse consequences of that failure.
Id. Finally, the Pope court concluded the parents had not met their burden in
establishing futility of the administrative process. To a similar effect see Franklin v.
Frid, 7 F. Supp. 2d 920, 925 (W.D. Mich. 1998). The Franklin court looked to the
pleadings and found an allegation of FAPE deprivation in its Count IV, and
dismissed the action for failure to exhaust. Id. at 925-26. The Franklins had
alleged they were satisfied with the IEP (Id. at 924-25), but that the child's aide
poked him, took away utensils, taunted him, hit and slapped him, and verbally
abused him. Id. at 921. Franklin could be explained as an implementation failure
case requiring exhaustion since the particular failures alleged were not
unambiguously included in the IEP.
173. McCormick v. Waukegan Sch. Dist. # 60, 374 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2004).
174. McCormick, 374 F.3d at 566. In McCormick, notwithstanding a physical
education teacher's notice of the risk to the student's health, she instructed the
student to run laps and perform push-ups. Id. She advised the student if he could
not complete those tasks, he would receive a failing grade in physical education
and would have to repeat the ninth grade. Id. Despite the student's protestations
and references to his IEP - containing express limitations on physical activity due
to known dangers, the teacher continued to threaten the student with failure and
berate him, until he agreed to perform the exercises. Id. Even though he informed
the teacher during the exercise that his muscles were cramping and hurting, she
insisted that he should continue, again ignoring the IEP. Id.
175. Id. at 1274-75.
176. See also e.g., M.Y. ex rel. J.Y. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 544 F.3d 885
(8th Cir. 2008). In M. Y parents sought damages under section 504 and section
1983 for a sexual assault suffered by the child on a school bus. The Court of
Appeals rejected the district's claim that the parents were required to exhaust IDEA
administrative remedies before seeking relief under these statutes. It explained that
IDEA's section 1415(1) exhaustion requirement was designed "to address
prospective educational benefits and not the past injuries that MY suffered from
the sexual assault." Id. at 888. This permitted the parents to proceed on the merits
of their claim. Id. at 888-90. To the same effect see, Campbell v. Nye County Sch.
Dist., No. 94-15747, 1995 WL 597706, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 1995) (mem. op.)
(finding that section1983 claim for compensatory damages based on beating of
students by school personnel where beatings were not disciplinary in nature would
not come within the purview of IDEA), and Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151,
D. Denial of Parent Access to IDEA's Due Process Procedures.
Courts may excuse exhaustion where the LEA fails to act on a
parent's request for a due process hearing, 17 7 or has failed to timely
conclude the hearing. 178 Moreover, courts may excuse exhaustion
where the LEA did not furnish to the parents adequate notice of the
administrative remedies that the IDEA requires them to exhaust.
179
1159 (6th Cir. 1987) (cause of action for substantive due process violation
recognized based upon corporal punishment which demonstrates "a brutal and
inhumane abuse of ... official power, literally shocking to the conscience). But
see, e.g., Brandon V. v. Chichester Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 2155722, at *5, 8 (E.D. Pa.
July 25, 2007) (dismissing section 504 claim, but not constitutional claims, seeking
only money damages, for failure to exhaust, where complaint alleged physical and
mental abuse including sexual assault, along with lack of appropriate programming
and instruction, all leading to regression).
177. See, e.g, Manecke v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas County, 762 F.2d 912, 919
(11 th Cir. 1985) ("The plain language of [IDEA] ... suggests that Congress must
not have intended [IDEA] to be the exclusive method to redress denial of access to
that very mechanism," allowing claim to go forward under section 1983), cert.
denied 474 U.S. 1062 (1986); C.O. v. Portland Pub. Schs., 46 IDELR 243 (D. Or.
2006) (finding allegations that SEA officials failed to conduct full investigation of
complaints, failed to implement legally required due process hearing procedures,
and failed to oversee local school district need not be exhausted); Hornstine v.
Township of Moorestown, 263 F. Supp. 2d 887, (D. N.J. 2003) (not requiring
exhaustion in action to compel naming of special education student as sole
valedictorian of high school class when SEA denied hearing on jurisdictional
grounds); Meehan v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 129 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) (excusing exhaustion when district ignored hearing requests); Doe v. Town
of Framingham, 965 F. Supp. 226 (D. Mass. 1997) (denying motion to dismiss
based on exhaustion when district allegedly deterred use of process by referring to
individualized education program as hypothetical); Upper Valley Ass'n for
Handicapped Citizens v. Mills, 928 F. Supp. 429 (D. Vt. 1996) (challenge to state
complaint resolution procedures); Essen v. Bd. of Educ., 1996 WL 191948
(N.D.N.Y. April 15, 1996) (failure to appoint hearing officer); Sherry v. New York
State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
178. E.g., Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 382 F. Supp. 2d 3, 9 (D.D.C. 2005)
(finding no administrative remedy to exhaust to compel district to timely conclude
due process hearing); but see Williams v. Overturf, 580 F. Supp. 1365, 1370 (W.D.
Wis. 1984) (finding that since Congress did not expressly allow a failure to
respond to be equated with a negative Tier II response for purposes of exhaustion,
parents would not be deemed under EAHA to have exhausted their administrative
remedies; mandamus was available to obtain a decision, albeit an untimely one).
179. E.g., Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom Honig
v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (no exhaustion required when parent not informed of
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This is so because failure of the defendants to so notify the plaintiffs
"deprive[s them] of the opportunity to take advantage of their
procedural safeguards offered by the statute."180
Parents will not be required to administratively exhaust issues
that the hearing officer refused to consider upon their request.'18
Moreover, direct access to the federal courts has been allowed where
a school district effectively denied a parent's request for an IEE at
district expense, by failing to initiate a due process hearing as
required by the Act, to establish that its evaluation was
appropriate.' 82 Exhaustion has been excused as well where the
agency has not adopted procedures to give parents access to due
process.' 83 Direct access to the courts was also allowed where the
parent alleged that a school official, through his fraud, completed a
form in the parents' names denying parental consent to evaluate their
appeal rights); Abney ex rel. Kantor v. Dist. of Columbia, 849 F.2d 1491 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (exhaustion not required for period in which surrogate parent did not receive
notice); Emma C. v. Eastin, 26 IDELR 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (excusing
exhaustion in action claiming failure to identify and evaluate children with
disabilities, leaving them unaware of procedural rights), overruling 26 IDELR 544
(N.D. Cal. 1997); Mason v. Schenectady Sch. Dist., 879 F. Supp. 215 (N.D.N.Y.
1993) (excusing exhaustion when parent contended that district failed to inform
parents of procedural rights, which followed Quackenbush v. Johnson City Sch.
Dist., 716 F.2d 141, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1071 (1984)).
180. Quackenbush v. Johnson City Sch. Dist., 716 F.2d 141, 147 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1071, 104 S.Ct. 1426 (1984).
181. E.g., Independent Sch. Dist. No. 623 v. Digre, 893 F.2d 987 (8th Cir.
1990) (affirming prevailing party status and fee award where IDEA issues were
excluded by hearing officer and SEA); Robertson v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 229
F.3d 1136, 2000 WL 1370273, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2376431, at n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (holding exhaustion does not apply to claims regarding safety that hearing
officer refused to consider), afid, 229 F.3d 1136, 33 IDELR 123 (2d Cir. 2000);
Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Peter C., 1994 WL 67944, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. March
1, 1994) (exhaustion excused where hearing officer failed to consider parents' lEE
request).
182. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 441 IDELR 106 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
183. E.g., Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074 (D. Neb. 1980) (futility in
challenging statutory administrative procedure), aff'd in part and vacated in part,
645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1981); Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979),
aff'd, 710 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1983) (exhaustion excused when no procedure to
challenge expulsion); Sherry v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328
(W.D.N.Y. 1979) (absence of hearing rights; exhaustion excused).
child, which effectively denied the child of needed IDEA services.1 84
One court excused exhaustion where a school district itself resorted
to the courts for a declaratory judgment on the issue of parental
surrogacy and then claimed that the parents were required to exhaust
on the issues they wished to litigate.' 85 Parents have not, however,
been uniformly successful where they have claimed denial of access
to the procedures IDEA was intended to afford. 1
86
E. The Emergency Doctrine.
The legislative history of the IDEA's predecessor, EAHA, listed
in its House Report, "emergency situations" within the futility
exception. An emergency exists where the failure to take immediate
action will adversely affect a child's mental or physical health.'87
The emergency exception to IDEA exhaustion should be "sparingly
invoked."'188 The burden of establishing futility based on the
emergency exception appears heavy: "[M]ere allegations by plaintiffs
of irreversible harm will not be enough to excuse the completion of
administrative proceedings. Plaintiffs must provide a sufficient
preliminary showing that the child will suffer serious and irreversible
mental or physical damage (e.g., irremediable intellectual regression)
before the administrative process may be circumvented."' 189
184. Quackenbush, 716 F.2d at 143.
185. Converse County Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Pratt, 993 F. Supp. 848 (D. Wyo.
1997).
186. See, e.g., Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of the Elyria City Sch., 149 F.3d 1182,
1998 WL 344061, at *4 (6th Cir. May 27, 1998) (dismissing claim on basis of
exhaustion when district did not provide hearing but parents' request was vague
and did not specify issues to be resolved); D.R. v. Bedford Bd. of Educ., 926 F.
Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (parents cannot avoid exhaustion by simply asserting
that a hearing officer was biased, without submitting evidence of the bias; Doe v.
East Greenwich Sch. Dep't, 899 A.D.2d 1258 2004 WL 2821639 (R.1. Sup. Ct.
December 3, 2004) (dismissing on exhaustion grounds despite delays in hearing
process and failure to create IEP when parents had withdrawn child from school
system and irreparable harm situation not present), aff'd by Doe v. East Greenwich
Sch. Dep't, 899 A.2d 1258 (R.I. 2006).
187. H.R. No. 296, 99th Cong. (1st Sess. 7 1985).
188. Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 779 (3d Cir.
1994); accord, Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206, 212 (1st Cir. 2000) (agreeing that
emergency exception should be invoked sparingly).
189. Komninos, 13 F.3d at 779.
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Courts have excused exhaustion in a variety of emergency
situations. These have included, for example, the failure of an LEA
to fund a unilateral placement; the lack of which might cause
irreparable harm to the child; 190 exclusion from an appropriate
education during an expulsion from school; 19' and mental and
behavioral deterioration of the child in the absence of a seven day-
per-week, 24-hour program.' 92  Other emergencies warranting
excusal from exhaustion under the Act have included a child's
insufficient access to adequate toileting facilities,' 93 denying access
to maintenance of a summer school placement, 9 4 and a state-wide
practice of charging parents fees for residential placements made by
the public agencies.195
Two recent cases rejecting emergency claims by parents are
Plumbly v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 2469169 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 17, 2006),196 and Olivas v. Cincinnati Pub. Schs, 171 Ohio
App. 3d 669 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). 197 In Plumbly, the court denied a
motion for a preliminary injunction, and granted dismissal for lack of
190. Id. at 777 (recognizing exception and remanding matter to district court
for determination of irreparable injury if district fails to fund unilateral residential
placement).
191. Gutin v. Washington Twp. Bd. of Educ., 467 F. Supp. 2d 414 (D.N.J.
2006) (denying summary judgment to defendants on claims based on board's
decision to exclude student from appropriate education while expelled).
192. Marcus X. v. Adams, 856 F. Supp. 395, 397 (E.D. Tenn. 1994) (excusing
exhaustion when child's mental condition and behavior were deteriorating daily in
absence of an "integrated education and treatment program").
193. Ramirez v. Dist. of Columbia, 31 IDELR 78 (D.D.C. 1999) (entering
preliminary injunction under Americans with Disabilities Act to require
accessibility of bathroom; noting futility and inadequacy of exhaustion).
194. Pachl v. Sch. Bd. of Independent Sch., 2003 WL 21406191, at *2 (D.
Minn. 2003) (finding exhaustion futile as a practical matter, where dispute centered
on entitlement to maintenance of placement in private summer program which
began "yesterday").
195. Parks v. Pavkovic, 536 F. Supp. 296, 302 (N.D. 111. 1982) (finding
parents could not obtain administrative relief before the residential school
discharged the students).
196. Plumbly v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist, 2006 WL 2469169 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 17, 2006).
197. Olivas v. Cincinnati Pub. Schs, 171 Ohio App. 3d 669 (Ohio Ct. App.
2007).
exhaustion. 198 There, the parents sought to stop expulsion of their
child where the settlement of a previous due process hearing included
an agreement that the child would no longer receive special education
services and would be enrolled in the district's regular education
program. In Olivas, the court held that the failure of the school
district to provide door-to-door transportation for a child unable to
get from an apartment door to the street did not support excusing
exhaustion when the parent could obtain alternative transportation
and seek reimbursement.' 99 Under the Third Circuit decision in
Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Board of Education, 13 F.3d 775
(1994), these cases were properly decided, since in both Plumbly and
Olivas plaintiffs did not establish that the children would suffer
"serious and irreversible mental or physical damage." 200 201
F. Untimely Due Process Decisions.
Judicial forums have sometimes been willing to excuse
exhaustion where the parents properly invoked IDEA due process
procedures, but the hearing officer taking jurisdiction of the case
failed to comply with IDEA-mandated timelines.2 °2 However, some
198. Plumbly, 2006 WL 2469169 at *3.
199. Olivas, 171 Ohio App. 3d at 675.
200. Where the Plumbly child remained age-eligible under IDEA and his
condition changed such that he required services under the Act, that part of the
agreement waiving future rights might violate public policy.
201. See also Christopher W. v. Portsmouth Sch. Comm., 877 F.2d 1089,
1097-98 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding no irreparable harm where student was not at the
time subject to an indefinite suspension or expulsion "which arguably might
require immediate attention").
202. See, e.g., McAdams v. Bd. of Educ., 216 F. Supp. 2d 86 (E.D.N.Y.
2002) (excusing exhaustion on futility grounds when challenge to previous IEP
took almost two years to decide); Engwiller v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 110 F.
Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding futility with regard to claim against state
for delays and allowing ten days before finding futility with regard to undecided
claim on merits against school district); Sabatini v. Coming-Painted Post Area Sch.
Dist., 78 F. Supp. 2d 138 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (excusing exhaustion when Tier-II
review officer's decision still pending despite expiration of 30-day deadline). But
see, e.g., Paul K. ex rel. Joshua K., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1235, 1238 (D. Haw.
2008) (finding the forty-five-day timeline to render a decision from the filing of the
due process complaint not to be jurisdictional, vacating hearing officer's order of
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courts have concluded that the remedy in such circumstances is to
obtain a mandamus order directing the hearing officer to decide the
case, rather than initially deciding the merits of the dispute itself.20 3
In some instances, the parties themselves have created the delay by
requesting postponements. In such cases the court may be more
likely to direct the parties to return to the administrative process,
rather than address the merits of the dispute itself.20 4
G. Status-Quo/Maintenance of Placement Violations
IDEA section 14150) requires that, absent agreement of the
parents and the LEA, the school district maintain the child in the
then-current educational placement during the pendency of
proceedings brought pursuant to that section.20 5 Murphy v. Arlington
Central School District, 297 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 2002),
illustrates the operation of this provision.20 6 There, a school district
refused to maintain a child in his then-current educational placement
(a private day school for which the parents had attained "pendency"
status by reason of a favorable Tier II review decision), while the
dismissal for failure to comply with the timeline and remanding to hearing officer
to proceed on merits).
203. E.g., Williams v. Overturf, 580 F. Supp. 1365 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (finding
no ground for failure to exhaust due to overdue administrative decision, and stating
that the party should seek mandamus).
204. See, e.g., Doe v. East Greenwich Sch. Dep't, 899 A.2d 1258 (R.I. Sup.
Ct. 2006) (affirming dismissal of claim for failure to exhaust when delay in hearing
officer decision beyond 45 days stemmed from parties' requested postponements of
hearing).
205. 20 U.S.C. § 14150) (2004). Excepts from this require a child's
placement made pursuant to section 1415(k)(4) - pertaining to placements in
interim alternative educational settings on disciplinary and dangerousness grounds,
subject to certain limitations. Although perhaps apparent, an invocation of stay-put
is conditioned on the child's current status as a child with an IDEA disability. Thus,
where a child's IEP team has previously determined he is no longer eligible for
special education and related services, and his parents later attempt to thwart his
expulsion from school based on stay-put principles, their application for an
injunction based on stay-put will be denied due to their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies over the non-eligibility determination. See E.K. v.
Stamford Bd. of Educ., 2007 WL 1746201 (D. Conn. June 15, 2007).
206. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 297 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir.
2002).
parents contested the next developed IEP.207 The court held that the
parents were not required to exhaust administrative remedies to
enforce their child's stay-put rights during the administrative and
judicial review process over the subsequent IEP, and granted the
parents' request for an injunction requiring the district to fund the
placement. 20 8  The court concluded that the administrative review
process was "inadequate" to remedy the LEA's violation of this rule
since the IDEA's stay-put provision is "time-sensitive" and judicial
intervention is necessary to give realistic protection to the claimed
right.2 9  To avoid exhaustion on the ground of "stay-put," the
proposed change to the pendency placement must be "fundamental"
or involve elimination of a basic element of the student's educational
program.2 10 211 212
207. Id. at 198-99.
208. Id. at 199-201.
209. Id. at 199. A necessary implication of this rule is that LEAs are required
to pay for the pendency placement until such time as the student's placement is
changed pursuant to IDEA's terms. See id. at 200-01, relying in part on Bd. of
Educ. v. Schutz, 290 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2002).
210. Lunceford v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 1577, 1582 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
211. In Alston et al.v. Dist. of Columbia, 439 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2006),
for example, the child's pendency placement was comprised of a day placement at
a special education middle school and a residential school component. After the
residential school announced it was closing, the parents sought from the district an
adequate substitute for that component, but the district refused to comply with that
request. The parents brought a direct action in the district court which granted the
parents' application for a stay-put injunction. The court held that if a child's then-
current placement is not available, the school system must place the student in a
similar program during the pendency of administrative and judicial proceedings.
Id. at91.
212. Even where the parents have not initiated due process proceedings over
the next succeeding IEP offered to the child, they may be able to obtain a stay-put
injunction where the district's appeal from a state hearing officer's decision -
awarding the parents reimbursement for the their unilateral placement related to an
earlier developed IEP - is still pending in the courts. This is because parents need
not exhaust their administrative remedies to benefit from IDEA's stay- put
provision. See, e.g., Cranston Sch. Dist. v. Q.D., 2008 WL 4145980 (D.R.I. Sept.
8, 2008).
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H. The Class Action.213 214
The sine qua non for permitting class actions to go forward
without IDEA exhaustion is a systemic violation.215  The Ninth
Circuit defines a systemic violation as follows:
[A] claim is 'systemic' if it implicates the integrity or
reliability of the IDEA dispute resolution procedures
themselves, or requires restructuring the education
system itself in order to comply with the dictates of the
Act; but ... it is not 'systemic' if it involves only a
substantive claim having to do with limited
components of a program, and if the administrative
process is capable of correcting the problem16
The Second Circuit in J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Central School
District, 386 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2004) attempted to distill its case
law in holding that certain violations of the Act were "systematic,"
213. Plaintiffs seeking to certify a class bear the burden of demonstrating the
four requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(a). In addition to satisfying all of Rule 23(a)'s requirements, the plaintiffs
requesting class certification must qualify under one of Rule 23(b)'s class
categories as well. Id. at 23(b). Under Rule 23(b) the class will be certified if
separate actions will create the risk of inconsistent adjudications, if the opposing
party's actions or omissions toward the class as a whole make injunctive or
declaratory relief appropriate, or if common questions predominate over individual
questions. Id. IDEA class actions are typically certified as so-called "(b)(2)"
classes, that is those where the opposing party's actions or omissions toward the
class as a whole make injunctive or declaratory relief appropriate.
214. For a history of the class action procedure, see Richard A. Nargareda,
Class Actions in the Administrative State: Klaven and Rosenfeld Revisited, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 603 (2008) (discussing relationship of agency oversight, the class
action procedure and individual rights, among other things).
215. Exhaustion may be excused where there are systemic violations that
cannot be remedied by local or state administrative agencies through the IDEA due
process mechanism "because the framework and procedures for assessing and
placing students in appropriate educational programs [are] at issue, or because the
nature and volume of complaints [are] incapable of correction of the administrative
hearing process." J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 107, 114 (2d
Cir. 2004).
216. Doe v. Ariz. Dept. of Educ., 111 F.3d 678, 682 (9th Cir. 1997). The Doe
court observed that, "[W]hat constitutes a systemic failure is not so easily defined."
Id. at 681.
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and that exhaustion was excused.2 17 The court found the following
common elements to exist:
...... [Tjhe plaintiffs' problems could not have been
remedied by administrative bodies because the
framework and procedures for assessing and placing
students in appropriate educational programs were at
issue, or because the nature and volume of complaints
were incapable of correction by the administrative
hearing process. If each plaintiff had been forced to
take his or her claim before a hearing officer and
appeal to another local or state official, there would
have been a high probability of inconsistent results.
Moreover, the plaintiffs' claims were such that an
administrative record would not have been of
substantial benefit to the district court. 2 18
In J.S., the plaintiff alleged the following systemic violations:
. . . failure to perform timely evaluations and
reevaluations of disabled children; failure to provide
parents with required procedural safeguards regarding
identification, evaluation, and accommodation of
otherwise disabled children; and failure to perform
legally required responsibilities in a timely manner,
including providing and implementing transition plans,
transitional support services, assistive technology
services, and declassification services for children with
disabilities.219
Moreover, the J.S. plaintiffs alleged that the LEA failed to
properly notify parents of meetings as required by law, provide
parents with legally required progress reports, and to provide
required staff training.220  Significantly, the complaint did not
challenge the content of particular IEPs, but rather the LEA's total
failure to prepare and implement IEPs.221 The court in J.S. affirmed
the lower court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss for failure
217. J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch. Dist. 386 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir.
2004).
218. Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
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to exhaust administrative remedies.222
Heldman ex rel. T.H. v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1992), is
another case illustrating when violations of the Act are systemic and
where exhaustion is excused.223 Heldman involved an attack on New
York's statutory scheme as it related to the selection of hearing
officers and its administrative review procedures. The court made
the following observations:
Resort to the New York state administrative process in
this case would be futile. Heldman claims that the
NYSED regulation specifying the hearing officer
selection procedure violates the mandate of IDEA.
Because the regulation implements a New York
statute, neither the Commissioner nor the assigned
hearing officer has the authority to alter the procedure;
therefore, it would be an exercise in futility to require
Heldman to exhaust the state administrative remedies
(internal citation omitted). To require a systemic
challenge, such as Heldman's, to pursue administrative
remedies would not further the purposes of IDEA and
would only serve to insulate the state procedures from
review - an outcome that would undermine the system
Congress selected for the protection of the rights of
children with disabilities.224 225
222. Id. at 116.
223. Heldman ex rel. T.H. v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1992).
224. Id. at 159 (footnote omitted). Other Second Circuit cases have found
systemic violations and excused exhaustion in the class action context. In
Handberry v. Thompson, 436 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2006), for example, the plaintiffs
challenged the Department of Education's and Department of Correction's actions
with respect to providing educational services to all entitled inmates. Id. at 60.
Relying on JS., the court concluded that individual administrative remedies would
be insufficient to address the defendants' failure to provide the service required by
the IDEA to all relevant inmates, and concluded that plaintiffs' failure to exhaust
did not bar the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. In J.G. v. Board of
Educ. of Rochester City Sch. Dist., 830 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1987), the court
concluded that class allegations of systemic failure to evaluate and place students,
to develop IEPs, and to inform parents of their rights excused administrative
exhaustion. Id. at 447-48. In the same year in Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748
(2d. Cir. 1987), the Second Circuit reviewed a judgment granted on the pleadings
and found that the plaintiffs were entitled to exemption from exhausting
administrative remedies since they were unlikely to receive adequate relief because
L Retaliation Claims for Exercise of Protected Rights.
In a case reviewed by the Second Circuit,226 a parent alleged that
the hearing officer lacked the authority to effectuate class action and system-wide
relief. In another class action, plaintiffs sought systemic reform to allow more
timely evaluation and placement of handicapped children in appropriate programs.
Id. at 757. This was Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1982), in which
plaintiffs sued New York City and various state officials for FAPE denial. Id.
There, the city's education commissioner acknowledged that "he would be unable
to expeditiously process the appeals of all the members of the plaintiff class were
they to pursue administrative proceedings. Id. at 869. In light of this admission
and the complexity of the educational issues involved, the court held it could not
be sure that . . . administrative remedies would not be 'futile' for purposes of
obtaining class relief," and excused exhaustion. Id.
225. In a more recent case, New Jersey Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. New Jersey
Dep't of Educ., 563 F. Supp. 2d 474 (D.N.J. 2008), the court held that plaintiffs
were not obligated to exhaust the IDEA's administrative remedies where they
alleged, among other things, a state-wide failure of the agency to enforce the Act's
Least Restrictive Environment requirement. Id. In particular, the plaintiffs made
the following allegations: Unnecessary segregation and denial of the students'
right to be educated with nondisabled students to the maximum extent appropriate;
and placement in general education classrooms without sufficient aids, services and
accommodations needed to receive an appropriate education. Id. at 486. Since the
students' complaint alleged systematic violations and they sought by judicial order,
restructuring of state mechanisms, no purpose would be served by employing
IDEA due process procedures. Id. In the same vein, see CG v. Pennsylvania Dept.
of Educ., 547 F. Supp. 2d 422 (M.D. Pa. 2008). There, the parents of special
education students challenged the state's allocation of special education funds
under IDEA and sought injunctive relief compelling state-wide restructuring of
special education funding. In these circumstances the court concluded exhaustion
would be futile since the complaint sought to correct a systemic deficiency rather
than individual relief for the children. Id. at 432-33; see also J.D. v. Nagin, 2008
WL 2522127 (E.D. La. June, 20, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss in class action
alleging that defendants failed to provide youth at pretrial detention center required
screening services, IEPs and a FAPE).
226. Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 287 F.3d 138 (2d Cir.
2002). In Weixel, IDEA exhaustion was excused because of the LEA's failure to
give the parent notice of IDEA's administrative remedies before the parent brought
suit. The court found that the parent had stated a claim sufficient to proceed under
IDEA as well, since she had pleaded facts which might establish IDEA eligibility
and FAPE failures under the Act. Id. at 148-50. Arguably, had the LEA provided
the parent with adequate notice of IDEA's administrative remedies the parent
might have been relegated to those procedures before the courts would entertain her
ADA and section 504 claims. This is because there was substantial relief available
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school officials threatened and instituted child welfare investigations
in response to the student's medically excused absences from school;
threatened to file child abuse charges in response to her efforts to
obtain home schooling for the student; refused to promote the student
to the eighth grade; and refused to evaluate the student academically
and place the student according to her abilities, allegedly in
retaliation for the student's attempts to obtain reasonable
accommodation. The court held that such allegations were sufficient
to support viable ADA and section 504 retaliation claims, without the
necessity of IDEA exhaustion.227
In Mosley v. Board of Education, City of Chicago,228 the court
held the parent stated a First Amendment retaliation claim under
section 1983 resulting from her efforts to obtain adequate educational
services for her son under IDEA and she was not required to exhaust
IDEA's administrative remedies to gain access to the courts.229 The
parent asserted that, for approximately two years, the LEA prevented
her from participating meaningfully in her role as chairperson of the
so-called Improving America Schools Act (IASA) Committee, to
which she had been elected; that it had deprived her of necessary
information for competent evaluation of a school's budget proposals;
and asked her to rubber stamp team decisions and lend her name to
decisions which might have been erroneous, in essence, preventing
her from serving as chairperson.230  Moreover, she asserted that a
teacher summoned the police to have her removed from the school
when she was passing out flyers inviting parents to attend an IASA
under IDEA to cure the classification failure and pedagogical deficiencies in the
child's program, even if it was not the precise relief the parent preferred.
227. See also Wiles v. Dep't of Educ., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1161-62 (D.
Haw. 2008) (holding although parents of autistic child never specifically raised
their section 504 retaliation claim at the IDEA due process proceeding, they were
not barred from pursuing that claim in court where they sought money damages
only). The section 504 retaliation cases do not answer the question of whether
asserting IDEA FAPE violations at the administrative level is sufficient to satisfy
section 1415(l)'s requirement for exhaustion of non-IDEA federal claims, where
relief is available under the IDEA. See Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 935
n. 11 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing, but not deciding the issue).






In M.TV. v. DeKalb County School District, 446 F.3d 1153 (1 1th
Cir. 2006), however, the court dismissed, for want of IDEA
exhaustion, claims brought by a parent pursuant to section 1983,
section 504, and ADA for retaliation against her and her son.232
Among the injuries the parent alleged were the following:
Harassment at IEP team meetings, sending plaintiffs intimidating
letters in response to educational demands, and subjecting the student
to intrusive and needless testing.233 The parent contended that the
retaliation was based on her advocacy for her son's right to receive
an appropriate education and be free from discrimination based on
his disability. The parent also argued that IDEA's administrative
process could not furnish a remedy for retaliation under these laws,
since she sought relief that was not "available" under the Act.234 The
court firmly rejected the parent's arguments, concluding that the
"claims clearly relate to M.T.V.'s evaluation and education and,
therefore, were subject to the exhaustion requirement., 235 236
231. In Mosley, the circuit court consolidated two lawsuits dismissed by
district courts, one brought on behalf of plaintiffs child under IDEA, dismissed for
failure to exhaust, and one brought under the First Amendment via § 1983 for
retaliation against the plaintiff parent, dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action. The Seventh Circuit reversed both dismissals.
232. M.T.V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
233. Id. at 1158.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1158-59. The M.TV. court went to great pains to explain that the
parent was required to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies for the specific forms
of retaliation to which her present complaint related. Thus, even though she had
raised the retaliation issue in earlier due process proceedings, that did not suffice
with respect to her current claims. Id. at 1159.
236. The M.TV. court relied, in part, on two First Circuit retaliation cases
involving IDEA exhaustion issues, both of which cases dismissed the complaint for
failure to exhaust. Id. at 1158-59 (citing Weber v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 212 F.3d
41, 51 (1st Cir. 2000), and Rose v. Yeaw, 241 F.3d 206, 210 (1st Cir. 2000).
Kutasi v. Las Virgenes, 494 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2007), presented similar facts to
M.T.V. In Kutasi, plaintiff parents filed a lawsuit under section 504 and section
1983 alleging a pattern and practice of retaliatory and discriminatory action against
them and their son. Id. at 1163. No prior administrative due process hearing had
been requested regarding the student's IEP. After the complaint was filed the
school district requested a due process hearing to determine the adequacy of the
proposed IEP. The Ninth Circuit held the plaintiffs were required to exhaust their
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J. The Absence of an IDEA Administrative Forum to Adjudicate the
Complaint.
In Blunt v. Lower Merion School District, 559 F. Supp. 2d 548
(E.D. Pa. 2008), multiple sets of parents filed a complaint asserting
that the Pennsylvania Department of Education, its Secretary and
Bureau of Special Education (Commonwealth) had failed to perform
compliance monitoring, complaint resolution and "child find" duties
as mandated by IDEA.237 The Commonwealth defendants asserted
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction since plaintiffs had failed
to exhaust IDEA's due process procedures. In rejecting this
argument, the court scrutinized IDEA and Pennsylvania regulations,
finding that the Commonwealth furnished a forum for IDEA disputes
between parents and local districts, but failed to provide one for
parents to challenge the actions of the Commonwealth defendants.
This, the court concluded, made exhaustion futile, thereby permitting
plaintiffs to proceed in court against the Commonwealth
defendants.238
K. Failure of SEA to Adequately Implement IDEA-Required Policies
and Procedures.
In Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi,239 the court held that plaintiffs were not
required to exhaust IDEA's administrative remedies where they
alleged that the State Board of Education failed to make bona fide
attempts to resolve complaints against an LEA and to fully
implement its obligations under the CRP.240 The court reasoned that
such exhaustion would be futile since a due process hearing officer
administrative remedies regarding the issues raised in their complaint because their
injuries could be redressed to some degree by IDEA. Id. at 1166, 1170.
237. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
238. Id. at 560.
239. Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1987), remanding Mrs. W. v.
Tirozzi, 706 F. Supp. 164, (D. Conn. 1989).
240. Id. at 750. On remand, the trial court denied defendants' motion on the
pleadings and held the plaintiffs stated a cause of action by asserting that the
agency's application of CRP constitutes a pattern and practice of failing to meet its
responsibility under the EAHA to assure that local boards are in compliance with
federal law. Tirozzi, 706 F. Supp. at 169.
lacked the authority to provide a remedy for the injury. 241
In the same vein, where a state maintained a settled policy of
disallowing special education programs in excess of 180 days - and
thereby denied a FAPE to students who needed extended school year
services, and conceded that the Act's due process "procedure[s]
would be futile," exhaustion was excused.242
L. Parents 'Independent Rights, or Lack Thereof.243
In Blanchard v. Morton School District, 420 F.3d 918 (9th Cir.
2005) a parent sought review of an order of the federal district court
dismissing her section 1983 claim for failure to exhaust the IDEA's
administrative remedies.244  In her complaint against the school
district and its officials, the parent sought money damages and other
relief for her own emotional distress and other injuries personal to
her, resulting from her efforts to secure special education services for
her son. The Ninth Circuit stated, "The issue in this appeal . . is
whether Blanchard was seeking 'relief that was also available under
the IDEA, so that exhaustion was required. ' 245  The Ninth Circuit
reversed the trial court, concluding that since the IDEA's
administrative remedies provided relief for disabled children, not
their parents, Blanchard's emotional distress could not be remedied
through the IDEA's administrative procedures. 246  The court
emphasized that its holding was a narrow one, merely that the
IDEA's procedural requirements posed no barrier to Blanchard's
claim. 247
241. Id. at 756.
242. Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028, 1033 n.17 (5th Cir. 1982) (table),
rehearing denied, 715 F.2d 577 (1983).
243. See Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, (2007) (holding
that parents have the status of real parties in interest under IDEA).
244. Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 420 F.3d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 2005).
245. Id. at 921.
246. Id. at 921-22.
247. Id. at 922. After the remand and a subsequent appeal back to the Ninth
Circuit, the court held that section 1983 does not create a cause of action for money
damages under the IDEA for lost earnings and suffering of a parent in pursuing her
child's IDEA rights. Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir.
2007), cert. denied, __ U.S._, 128 S.Ct. 1447(2008). The court observed that it
was not required to decide here whether Blanchard might have had an individual
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In Taylor v. Vermont Dep't of Pub. Edu., 313 F.3d 768 (2d Cir.
2002), a non-custodial parent brought a section 1983 action to
enforce her IDEA-conferred right to access her child's educational
records.2 48  The parent had previously brought a due process
proceeding complaining, among other things, about the child's
education program. The IDEA hearing officer dismissed her from
the case, ruling that she lacked standing to challenge educational
decisions about her daughter based on the custody decree. 249
Moreover, the hearing officer concluded that since the IDEA confers
jurisdiction on hearing officers only with respect to "the
identification, evaluation, and placement" of the student in a special
education program, his jurisdiction did not encompass parental
claims concerning her treatment, including access to records under
IDEA. 250 Agreeing with the hearing officer that IDEA's due process
procedures did not furnish a remedy for this parent's records access
claim, the Second Circuit held that use of IDEA's administrative
procedures would be futile.251
M. Parental Refusal of IDEA Classification as a Ground for
Exhaustion Avoidance.
IDEA provides expressly that parents may refuse IDEA eligibility
and services. 252 This creates interpretative problems in construing
section 1415(1), since IDEA services might be "available" to the
child, but for the parents' exercise of this right to refuse. M.G. v.
Crisfield, 547 F. Supp. 2d 399 (D. N.J. 2008), is a case in point.253 In
M.G., the parents exercised their right to refuse IDEA classification
and services, contending that their child was not disabled and did not
cause of action under ADA and section 504 for emotional distress resulting from
her enforcement of her child's rights against the LEA because she did not preserve
that issue for appellate review. Id. at 938.
248. Taylor v. Vermont Dep't of Pub. Educ., 313 F.3d 768 (2d Cir. 2002).
249. Id. at 788 n. 18.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 789.
252. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D) (2006).
253. M.G. v. Crisfield, 547 F. Supp. 2d 399 (D.N.J. 2008).
require special education and related services of any kind.254 The
parents alleged that, thereafter, the student was suspended
indefinitely from school for alleged misconduct. The parents further
claimed they were told that if they did not consent to IDEA
classification and an out-of-district placement, he would be placed in
an elementary school for handicapped children or in another school
with the equivalent of handicapped services. Plaintiffs refused these
options. 2
55
The parents then brought an action under section 1983, alleging a
constitutional due process violation.256 They contended their son
received inadequate pre-deprivation procedures.257 Moreover, they
asserted a section 504 claim on the ground that the student was
"regarded as" having a disability and, therefore, discriminated
against.258 The court rejected the agency's defense that the parents'
claims were barred by their failure to exhaust IDEA administrative
remedies because the parents did not allege the student was
disabled.259 Indeed, they vigorously contended he was not, and
exercised their statutory right to refuse classification and services.260
Therefore, the plaintiffs could get no relief whatsoever from
IDEA.261 The court observed that this was not a situation where the
parents cloaked their IDEA claims in constitutional and section 504
garb because they disavowed any disability-related benefits. In
parsing their complaint, the court concluded the due process claim
asserted an unlawful removal from school in the absence of adequate
constitutional procedures, a right enjoyed by "any general education
student."262 Respecting the section 504 claim, the court concluded
that, like the due process claim, this section 504 "regarded as" cause
of action could be brought by "any general education student" who
254. This relieved the school district from its obligation to convene an IEP,
develop an IEP, or provide a FAPE - including special education and related
services - for this student. Id. at 414 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)).
255. Id. at 414.
256. Id. at 415.
257. Id.
258. Id. at415-16.
259. M.G., 547 F. Supp. 2d at 416-17.
260. Id. at 416.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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claims to have been discriminated against because of a perceived
disability. 263 264
N. Non-FAPE Programming and Services
In AP ex rel. Peterson v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. No. 11, 538 F.
Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Minn. 2008), the parents of a child with Type-I
diabetes attempted to enroll the five-year old in a summer day care
program run by a public school district.265  They requested from the
day care program, staff training and the grant of authorization to its
staff, to operate the child's blood-glucose meter and insulin pump,
activities the parents asserted were necessary for the child to
participate safely. After the district refused the requested
accommodations, the parents sued the school district under section
504 and Title II of the ADA, among other statutes, for compensatory
damages for refusal to grant the requested accommodations. The
court rejected the district's defense that the parents had failed to
exhaust IDEA's administrative remedies. The court observed that the
parents' claims related to a summer day care program, and not to an
educational program offered by the child's regular elementary
school.266 In other words, in AP, FAPE was not an issue. Moreover,
to the extent that the summer program might be construed as the
equivalent of kindergarten, the court concluded that plaintiffs'
section 504 and ADA claims were only tangentially related to his
education. Accordingly, the parents were not obligated to exhaust
263. Id. at 417 (emphasis in original).
264. Notably, the M.G. court rejected the parents' claim that the school district
violated the student's rights by failing to provide him with a so-called
"manifestation hearing." Id. at 419. The purpose of a manifestation hearing is to
determine whether a student's misconduct is a result of the student's disability. If
so, the district is obligated to provide certain educational benefits, among other
things, to the disabled child during his suspension, notwithstanding that
misconduct. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1). The M.G. court concluded that by foregoing
IDEA classification and programming the parents waived the right to claim
benefits for the child under IDEA. See M.G., 547 F. Supp. 2d at 418-19
(discussing, in general, manifestation procedures). In essence the court told the
parents they couldn't have it both ways.
265. AP ex rel. Peterson v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. No. 11, 538 F. Supp. 2d
1125 (D. Minn. 2008).
266. Id. at 1152.
IDEA's administrative remedies. 267 268
VIII. IDEA EXHAUSTION: JURISDICTION GIVING DEVICE OR CLAIMS
PROCESSING?
269 270
This part critically examines the majority view that courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiffs have failed to exhaust
IDEA's administrative remedies, as required by sections 1415(i) and
(1) of the Act. This challenge derives from a trilogy of non-IDEA
exhaustion cases recently decided by the United States Supreme
Court.
A. United States Supreme Court Jurisprudence.
In Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004) the Supreme Court held
that in bankruptcy proceedings, the sixty-day time limit found in
Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a) for a creditor to file a complaint objecting
to the debtor's discharge is not jurisdictional, but rather is a
judicially-created "claim-processing rule" that is subject to waiver
and forfeiture.2 7' The Court reasoned that under the bankruptcy laws,
Congress provided that "objections to discharges" are "[c]ore
proceedings" that are clearly within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, and that no statute curtails that jurisdiction by specifying a
time limit for filing a complaint objecting to discharge. 72 Thus, Rule
267. Id.
268. See also Spann ex rel. Hopkins v. Word of Faith Christian Ctr. Church,
589 F. Supp. 2d 759 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (in suit against church daycare/preschool
program under section 504, claim that school refused to allow autistic child to fully
enroll in program solely because of his disability did not require exhaustion;
plaintiff alleged "pure discrimination claim" for which IDEA offered no relief).
269. The party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court bears the
burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
270. "If exhaustion is a jurisdictional requirement, the district court must
always dismiss if there has been a failure to exhaust. If exhaustion is not
jurisdictional, the court must dismiss only if the issue has been properly presented
for decision." McQueen, 488 F.3d at 873 (finding no need to decide jurisdictional
issue "because there [was] no question of waiver or forfeiture by the District").
271. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454-56 (2004).
272. Id. at 453-54 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(J)).
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4004(a)'s sixty-day time limit does not affect "the classes of cases
falling within a court's adjudicatory authority;" that is, its subject
matter jurisdiction.273
The Supreme Court in Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12
(2005) (per curium), followed Kontrick in holding that the seven-day
time limit for a defendant to file a motion for a new trial pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 was not jurisdictional.274 The
Court explained that Rule 33, like Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a), is
nothing more than an "emphatic time prescription in [a] rule[ ] of
court" that regulates motion practice in an action - a federal criminal
prosecution - over which district courts already possess subject
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate.275 276
Kontrick and Eberhart thus teach that where Congress has
provided courts with jurisdiction over the claim at issue, judicial
rules cannot be relied upon to abdicate that jurisdiction. 277 In both
cases, Congress had clearly provided jurisdiction over the underlying
actions - an objection to discharge and a federal criminal prosecution
- and the time limitations that affected the processing of those
actions were not dictated by statute in a way that could affect the
authority of the court to adjudicate the disputes.
B. Kontrick and Eberhart and IDEA.
The overwhelming majority of appellate courts considering the
issue have concluded that failure to exhaust IDEA's administrative
remedies is jurisdictional.278 At first blush, these decisions might
273. Id. at 455.
274. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 13 (2005) (per curium).
275. Id. at 18 (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 454).
276. In reaching its conclusion, the Court stressed that "'[c]larity would be
facilitated'...'if courts and litigants used the label "jurisdictional" not for claim-
processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject
matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's
adjudicatory authority."' Id. at 16 (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455).
277. See Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 452-53 (holding, "Only Congress may
determine a lower federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction.... '[I]t is axiomatic'
that [judicially-created] rules 'do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction.' ")
(quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978)).
278. See, e.g., Ellenberg v. N.M. Military Inst., 478 F.3d 1262, 1279 (10th
Cir. 2007); Fliess v. Washoe County Sch. Dist., 90 F. App'x. 240, 242 (9th Cir.
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appear to be sound since, as illustrated in Part IV, A above, IDEA's
section 1415(i) and (1) require completion of the §§ 1415(i)(1) &
(i)(2) state review process before a plaintiff may obtain judicial relief
under IDEA, the Constitution, section 504, ADA, or other federal
laws protecting children with disabilities, where some IDEA relief is
available for the conduct subject to complaint. The argument would
be that although IDEA creates a series of procedural protections for
disabled children as a means to ensure their "access to a free
appropriate public education,"'279 and a right to appeal that decision
before a state review officer,28 ° it does not permit students or their
parents to sue the moment they are dissatisfied with the outcome of
any of these proceedings. Rather, IDEA grants prospective plaintiffs
access to federal or state courts only at the end of the administrative
process, after a "final" decision is rendered in the dispute. 28' Thus,
the argument would go, courts' subject matter jurisdiction for IDEA
suits is linked inextricably to the state's rendering a final decision.282
The argument would continue: IDEA makes a plaintiffs right to
use the courts subject to his being "aggrieved by the [final] findings
and decision." 283 This requirement seems unambiguous, appearing to
manifest a Congressional intent, for jurisdictional purposes, that the
2004) (unpublished decision); Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City
Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 2002); Babicz v. Sch. Bd. of Broward
County, 135 F.3d 1420, 1421 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
816 (1998); W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 491 (3d Cir. 1995); Christopher W. v.
Portsmouth Sch. Comm., 877 F.2d 1089, 1095 (1st Cir.1989). See also J.W. ex rel.
J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1213 (E.D. Cal. 2008)
(holding that court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when plaintiff asserting
section 504 claim failed to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies) (citing Polera,
288 F.3d 478; Babicz, 135 F.3d 1420); but see Mosely v. Bd. of Educ. of City of
Chicago, 434 F.3d 527, 532-33 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that IDEA's exhaustion
requirement is a claims processing rule and not a jurisdiction granting provision).
279. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3).
280. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g).
281. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(1) & (i)(2).
282. Courts, of course, do not possess jurisdiction over claims that Congress
has specified do not yet exist. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007)
("Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts
have jurisdiction to consider. Because Congress decides whether federal courts can
hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, federal
courts can hear them").
283. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
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plaintiff must assert some injury emanating from the agency's "final"
decision in order to bring an IDEA-based claim into court.
284
C. Enter Jones v. Bock.
In 2007, the Supreme Court in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199
(2007) addressed the relationship of administrative exhaustion rules
and formal pleading obligations.285 It held unanimously that prison
inmates' failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) as an affirmative defense and not an
element of an adequately stated claim under section 1983. While
recognizing that under the PLRA exhaustion was mandatory before
commencing a section 1983 judicial action,286 the Jones court
observed that PLRA was silent on the issue whether exhaustion must
be pleaded as an element of the claim, or is an affirmative defense
which may be waived.287 According to the court, this silence is
strong evidence that the usual practice of regarding exhaustion as an
affirmative defense to be pleaded and demonstrated should be
followed.288 The Jones court said to do otherwise would create a
heightened pleading requirement, thereby departing from Rule 8's
plain statement pleading standards.289 290 Notably, the court
284. See, e.g., J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp.
2d 1212, 1219-20 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under IDEA based on plaintiffs' failure to establish facts sufficient to
show they exhausted the required administrative remedies respecting their
allegation that defendants failed to produce all school records they requested, and
that in meeting defendants' factual jurisdictional attack, the plaintiff must furnish
affidavits and other evidence sufficient to establish the court's subject matter
jurisdiction). Id. at 1220.
285. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
286. Id. at 211.
287. Id. at 212.
288. Id.
289. Id. Rule 8 states:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which
the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has
jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to
support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for
expressly rejected the argument that PLRA exhaustion should be
read into the statute as a pleading requirement since PLRA's raison
d'etre was reduction of the number of prisoner complaints clogging
the federal courts, and exhaustion was the principal tool to achieve
this end.
Indeed, the Jones court asserted that the statute's extensive
addressing of exhaustion proved the opposite.291  It simply
highlighted the failure of Congress to include exhaustion among the
enumerated grounds justifying dismissal upon early screening.2 92
Jones means that when courts consider complaints brought under
IDEA, they must apply Rule 8's "liberal" pleading standards and not
require allegations concerning plaintiffs administrative exhaustion in
the jurisdictional statement or as an element of the IDEA cause of
action. In the same vein they must apply Rule 8's "liberal" standards
to section 504, the ADA, and section 1983 claims, even where they
implicate an IDEA cause of action, since these statutes do not impose
a heightened pleading requirement either.
the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the alternative or of several
different types may be demanded.
Id.
290. Rule 8's pleading requirements are relatively lenient upon pleaders in
federal court. See Dura Phar., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (holding,
"ordinary pleading rules are not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff').
Absent an exception to Rule 8's requirements, litigants are generally required to
satisfy only "notice" pleading obligations; that is, they must provide their opponent
with fair notice of their claim and grounds upon which the claim rests. See, e.g.,
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 US. 506, 512, (2002); Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Under Rule 8 the complaint must "directly or inferentially
contain allegations from which each of the material elements necessary to support a
recovery under some cognizable legal theory can be discerned. See e.g., Jordan v.
Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006); Snow v. Direct TV, Inc., 450
F.3d 1314, 1320 (1 1th Cir. 2006). The notice pleading standard does not apply in
certain particular contexts. See Rule 9(b) (requiring particularity for fraud and
mistake). IDEA does not contain a provision requiring extra factual detail beyond
the minimal notice requirement.
291. Jones, 549 U.S. at 212.
292. Id. Jones was careful to point out that it did not intend to say that failure
to exhaust might not be a basis to dismiss for failure to state a claim, where the
complaint on - its face and taken as true - shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to
relief Id. at 215.
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D. The Impact of Kontrick, Eberhart, and Jones on IDEA Exhaustion
as a Claims Processing Rule Versus a Jurisdiction-Creating
Predicate.
The Kontrick, Eberhart, and Jones trilogy cast into serious doubt
the majority view that a plaintiffs failure to exhaust IDEA's
administrative remedies is a jurisdictional defect.29 3 Consistent with
these decisions, Congress's failure to refer in section 1415's text to
administrative exhaustion and individual injury resulting from the
agency's decision as establishing courts' subject matter jurisdiction,
suggests strongly that the Seventh Circuit's decision in Mosley v.
Board of Educ. of Chicago, 434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2006), comports
more closely with these cases than with the majority view in the
circuits when it decided that failure to exhaust IDEA's administrative
remedies is not a jurisdiction defect.29 4 295 This means, if a court
examines a complaint brought pursuant to IDEA and dismisses it
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) - for want of
293. In Ellenberg, the Tenth Circuit treated a failure to exhaust IDEA's
administrative remedies as jurisdictional. Ellenberg, 478 F.3d at 1262. Later that
year, the Tenth Circuit in McQueen, questioned, in light of Jones, whether the
exhaustion requirement was jurisdictional. Because the defendant in McQueen
neither waived nor forfeited the defense, the McQueen court did not have to reach
this issue. McQueen, 488 F.3d at 873. Recently, in B.H. ex rel. K.H. v. Portage
Public Sch. Bd. of Educ., 2009 WL 277051, at *3-4, 7, 13 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 2,
2009), the court - applying Jones - concluded that an IDEA exhaustion failure was
not jurisdictional, but dismissed the section 504 claims anyway. The undisputed
facts, established outside of the pleadings, made clear that IDEA relief was
available for the injuries alleged in due process proceedings.
294. Mosley v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2006).
295. The Mosley court relied on Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)
and its pre-Kontrick decision in Charlie F., in concluding that IDEA's exhaustion
requirement was a claims processing rule. This means that the earliest possible time
to consider a 12(b)(1) jurisdictional motion would normally be after the answer has
been filed, if it is possible to decide the issue through a Rule 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Mosley, 434 F.3d at 533. Although there may be cases
where the allegations in the complaint, even when construed most favorably to the
plaintiff, might justify a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
based on failure to exhaust, such a disposition would not typically occur unless
there was no way for plaintiff to salvage her claim. Plaintiffs have no obligation to
allege facts negating an affirmative defense in their complaints. Id. In Mosley,
there was nothing on the face of the complaint that compelled the conclusion that
she failed to exhaust. Id.
subject matter jurisdiction, on ground that the plaintiff failed to plead
IDEA exhaustion, that decision should be reversed on appeal.296
Moreover, where the LEA or SEA fails to plead affirmatively
plaintiffs failure to exhaust in its answer and prove same on a
summary judgment motion,297 or in an appropriate case, a motion on
the pleadings,298 defendants may waive this otherwise valid IDEA
defense. Finally, in light of Jones, courts should not dismiss an
IDEA plaintiffs claim for failure to state a cause of action under
Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that plaintiff fails to assert that he/she
completed IDEA's exhaustion requirements, since that would impose
on plaintiff a heightened pleading obligation under circumstances not
permitted by Jones, since IDEA's text does not establish that
requirement.
E. Jurisdiction v. Claims Processing Distinction for ADA, Section
504, and Other Federal Laws Protecting the Rights of Children with
Disabilities
If Kontrick, Eberhart, and Jones portend a re-examination of the
jurisdictional versus claims processing distinction in the First,
Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits for direct IDEA claims,
they suggest even more strongly that claims brought under the
Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Title V of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and "other Federal laws protecting
the rights of children with disabilities" - should be subject to claims
processing rules and not jurisdictional treatment.299 Section 1415(1)
sweeps these laws into its exhaustion ambit. That provision dovetails
with section 1415(i)(2)(A)'s exhaustion requirement for actions
brought directly under IDEA. Both sections are silent on the
question of jurisdictional prerequisites and pleading requirements.
This strongly suggests that these other claims, like those under IDEA,
should be subject to "claims processing," not jurisdictional treatment,
under Kontrick, Eberhart, and Jones.
Neither section 504, the ADA, nor section 1983 contain
296. See Mosley, 434 F.3d at 533.
297. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
298. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
299. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1).
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provisions requiring administrative exhaustion and each statute has
legislative origins separate from IDEA. For courts to create a
jurisdictional bar for failure to exhaust IDEA-created remedies may
erect obstacles not contemplated by Congress for these causes of
action.300
IX. PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE ACT
Section 1415(l)'s provision requiring exhaustion where "relief []
is also available under [the IDEA]" means that the IDEA must offer
some relief suitable to remedy part or all of the injury inflicted on the
plaintiff specified in, or necessarily implied from, the complaint
brought under section 504, the ADA, the Constitution, or other
statutes which protect the rights of children with disabilities. 30 1
Courts seem to agree that for IDEA exhaustion to be required, the
conduct of which a plaintiff complains must infringe on IDEA-
created rights. This necessarily relates to the "identification,
evaluation, educational placement of the child, [or] the provision of a
free appropriate public education to such child."30 2 This insures that
whatever relief is fashioned is linked meaningfully to an IDEA and
not some other injury. The operative facts underlying the complaint
speak to whether the injury is tethered to IDEA for exhaustion
purposes.
The relief referred to in section 1415(1) must mean declarations,
orders for future conduct, reimbursement of tuition and other costs,
compensatory education, IEE-related remedies, rescission of
diplomas, and expunction of records. This is the only relief available
in IDEA due process proceedings. It does not mean the IDEA
remedy will give all that plaintiff prefers, or might be available under
other statutes, but rather it will provides relief that is meaningful,
within the IDEA framework, and that is not de minimus. Since the
relief available through the due process mechanism may be
300. Moreover, sections 1983 and 504 were enacted prior to EAHA, the
predecessor to IDEA. This gives further force to the argument that Congress would
have alerted litigants to a jurisdictional bar in IDEA or by amending these other
statutes, if that was what it intended.
301. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1).
302. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3)(B). This is the predicate for invoking IDEA due
process, and the hearing officer's subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at § 1415(b).
incomplete, relative to other viable causes of action available to the
plaintiff, section 1415 permits the plaintiff to obtain such other and
additional relief after obtaining a final administrative order under the
state law mechanism implementing the IDEA's due process
procedures.
In the same vein, where plaintiff brings a direct action under
IDEA, the foregoing analysis would apply respecting section
1415(i)(2)(A)'s exhaustion requirement. The court should examine
the agency's conduct for its pertinence to IDEA-created rights. If it
finds that the injury alleged relates to the "identification, evaluation,
or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free
appropriate public education to such child," the plaintiff will be
required to exhaust unless exhaustion is excused.
The criteria applied by the courts in exhaustion excusal disputes
have been largely derived from traditional administrative law
principles as to the purposes of exhaustion and from the Act's
legislative history, effectively reading that history into the statute.30 3
There is some doubt about whether these methods for determining
excusal are sound, in light of recent developments at the Supreme
Court, as discussed in Part VII above.
Although IDEA's legislative history could certainly be used to
303. See, e.g., Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1014 n. 17 (1984) (citing
Robert M. v. Benton, 622 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1980); Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F.
Supp. 1074 (D. Neb.1980), affd in part and vacated in part, 645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir.
1981); Howard S. v. Friendswood Indep. Sch. Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex.
1978); Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 601-02 (E.D. Pa. 1979), remanded
on other grounds sub nom. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 968, (D.C. 1981); North v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136
(D.D.C. 1979); Christopher S. v. Stanislaus County Office of Educ., 384 F.3d
1205, 1213 (9th Cir. 2004) (relying on "Congressional intent behind the IDEA
scheme," without a specific reference, to excuse exhaustion where parent had put
the SEA "on notice [via CRP] of the facially unlawful policy of providing a
shortened school day for all autistic students", and the SEA declined to act);
Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148,158-59 & n. 11 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that the
three recognized exceptions to exhaustion of IDEA claims - futility, a challenge to
a policy of general applicability, and inadequacy of relief- derive directly from the
legislative history of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and
the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, the precursors to the IDEA);
Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1992); and
other cases cited in Parts IV and VI hereof; 121 Cong. Rec. 37416 (1975) (remarks
of Sen. Williams) (holding, "exhaustion . . . should not be required . . . in cases
where such exhaustion would be futile either as a legal or practical matter").
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argue for exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, at least where
they are sufficiently particularized, Jones dictates a different analytic
framework, one relying directly on the text of statute. Under this
view, the absence of express textual authority in section 1415
explaining when exhaustion is required, and when it is excused,
requires the application of tools of statutory construction which may
produce results which are unpredictable, if not unsound.3 °4 305
Moreover, it augers confusion about courts' subject matter
jurisdiction. Rather than continuing to operate in a jurisprudence of
doubt, Congress should take up the gauntlet of reform and solve these
important problems.
A. Delineating Excusal of IDEA's Exhaustion Requirements.
The case law reviewed in Parts IV and VI above suggests how
IDEA's purposes may be more completely fulfilled. IDEA
exhaustion should not be required where the agency denies parents
access to IDEA's due process procedures; fails to give them written
notice of IDEA due process procedures; or in emergency situations
which will result in permanent and irreparable harm to the child, in
the absence of immediate judicial relief. IDEA exhaustion should
not be required where the child has suffered past physical injuries
under the school's auspices, whether of a permanent or non-
permanent nature. Although this type of claim may sometimes blend
with IEP implementation review, especially respecting severely
304. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 214-17 (eschewing, in PLRA context,
courts overstepping established procedural rules and substituting their own notions
of appropriate policy respecting administrative exhaustion). See also Leatherman
v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S 163, 168
(1993) (holding, given that the PLRA does not itself require plaintiffs to plead
exhaustion, such a result "must be obtained by... amending the Federal Rules, and
not by judicial interpretation)." See also Elliot M. Davis, The Newer Textualism:
Justice Alito's Statutory Interpretation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 983
(2007) (examining statutory construction through use of legislative history, using
Justices Scalia and Alito to illustrate differing approaches).
305. In Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007), even
though there was no specific provision in IDEA mandating in direct and explicit
terms that parents have the status of real parties in interest, the Court examined the
entire text of the statute and determined parents had such rights. Notably, the Court
found it unnecessary to resort to legislative history to answer the question posed.
Id. at 521-23.
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disabled children - for example, physical contact with the child in a
behavioral intervention program, such claims are sufficiently
independent of the IDEA framework to warrant exhaustion excusal.
Moreover, exhaustion should noL be required where the following
occurs: the agency refuses to maintain the child in the status quo or
pendency placement; class action plaintiffs seek systemic reforms,
rather than individual relief; where retaliation for exercise of
protected rights occurs and that retaliation does not deprive the
student of his IDEA right to identification, evaluation, educational
placement, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to
such child; or if the state's administrative apparatus does not provide
a forum to adjudicate the dispute. Exhaustion should not be required
where the state's statutory and/or regulatory bodies failed to
adequately implement IDEA-required policies and procedures.
In this regard, parents should not have to exhaust a process,
doomed to grant no relief, on the thin reed that the court will be
assisted by factual development and agency expertise from the very
agency whose rules defeat the child's IDEA rights. IDEA should not
compel exhaustion where the parents have exercised their IDEA-
based right to refuse classification and services for the student, as
expressly permitted by IDEA, and then assert non-IDEA claims in
court. Moreover, exhaustion should not be required where the parties
have stipulated to the classification of the child under section 504,
and then the parents complain of agency non-compliance with the
agreed-to services regimen under that other statute. This should be
the case regardless of whether the student is possibly IDEA eligible,
in light of the parties' prior agreement as to the student's status. 30 6
306. The problem of issue exhaustion is more difficult, especially since
parents and districts often appear unrepresented by attorneys at IDEA
administrative proceedings. Where, for example, a party has completed the
administrative process, but failed to articulate an issue - say in a list of issues it is
asking the hearing officer to adjudicate - should it be permitted to raise that issue
in court? This author tends to favor not permitting the parties to raise that issue,
unless - in the case of parents, the LEA failed to provide adequate notice of that
particular right. Raising an issue for the first time in court does violence to the
purposes of exhaustion, including application of agency expertise and development
of a factual record, for example. Moreover, it would also create problems in parties
getting notice of what issues were being tried, how to prepare the case, and
efficiency in use of resources. This view is not uniform. See Mark C. Weber,
SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE, 21:19 (3d ed. 2008)
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Section 1415 should be amended to authorize bringing a direct
action under IDEA in the enumerated circumstances listed in the
preceding paragraphs. It should expressly state that exhaustion shall
not be required to obtain relief in a civil action in a state court of
competent jurisdiction or a district court of the United States for
relief from these injuries. Each of these recommendations advances
the interests of children protected by the Act, and is justified by
sound policy, emanating from case law interpreting IDEA.
B. Heightened Pleading Requirement.
Nevertheless, because each of these recommendations may invite
some attempts to avoid exhaustion when it should be used, section
1415 should also contain a requirement that when a civil action is
brought on any of these grounds, the plaintiff must specifically state
the facts giving rise to the claim. This will enable the court to
determine facially whether an adequate IDEA claim is stated, which
falls within these enumerated exceptions. This would create a
heightened pleading obligation, analogous to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 9, which is consistent with the requirements of
Kontrick, Eberhart, and Jones, in that its origin was Congressional.
More importantly, it would create an understandable framework for
parents, agencies and courts in performing their assigned roles within
IDEA's framework.
C. Residue Exception to the IDEA Exhaustion Obligation.
IDEA should also create a residue form of "futility and
inadequacy," which would permit avoidance of the IDEA
administrative process for circumstances not included in the proposed
amendments. IDEA should make available a summary proceeding
whereby putative plaintiffs who claim IDEA administrative due
process is futile or inadequate can engage the court by summary
motion for a determination of this issue. In effect, it would be an
action, brought as a motion, which the court would be required to
dispose of it in short-measure; sixty days from its inception, for
example, might suffice. The complaint would be accompanied by
(recommending an approach whereby the court would determine whether a "waiver
of any contention or request for relief' occurred during the due process hearing).
affidavits in support of the complaint, and the answer would include
responsive affidavits and other papers, as appropriate. If sufficient
factual questions arise from the submissions, the court would hold a
hearing forthwith, and resolve questions of fact, and decide whether
it has jurisdiction to decide the case. This will produce a timely,
relatively inexpensive, and expeditious solution, which preserves the
respective rights of the parties, and enables IDEA's purposes to be
better realized.
D. Establishing Agency Non-Compliance with Final Due Process
Orders as a Basis for Federal Jurisdiction.
IDEA section 1415(i)(2)(A) authorizes an "aggrieved" party to
bring a civil action in a state court of competent jurisdiction, or a
federal district court, for review of a final order obtained within the
due process apparatus.3" 7 A party who prevails after exhausting due
process is not "aggrieved" by that order. Where the agency fails
thereafter to provide the relief granted administratively, a party is
certainly aggrieved, but not by the final order. Thus, the Act, by its
terms, fails to create the jurisdictional predicate to enforce the victory
won administratively. Some of the cases reviewed have permitted
enforcement actions to proceed under section 1983, recognizing
implicitly or explicitly that refusing enforcement would defeat the
purposes of the Act. 30 8 However, the viability of the enforceability
of IDEA rights through section 1983 is not free from doubt.30 9 Some
307. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
308. See, e.g., supra notes 151 and 154.
309. See Suzanne Solomon, The Intersection of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 76 FoRDHAM L. REv. 3035 (2008)
(arguing that the legislative history of the 2004 amendment to IDEA section 1415
manifests a specific congressional intent that IDEA violations be addressed through
section 1983); see also Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public
Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1079, 1113-19 (2002) (relying on legislative
intent and concluding that section 1983 damage claims are available for IDEA
violations and other suitable cases); Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Can Section 1983 Be
Used to Redress Violations of the IDEA? An Update. 230 West's EDUC. L.
REPORTER 453 (2008) (arguing that section 1983 should be reserved for egregious
conduct by school officials, such as failure of school officials to implement a
hearing officer's order, among other conduct, but not explaining why, in light of
the prevailing authority he cites, section 1983 is available for IDEA enforcement).
But see Terry Jean Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar: Section 1983 Damage Claims in
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courts have granted enforcement relief under IDEA, 3 0 based on the
conclusion the party is aggrieved by the agency's non-compliance. 311
Congress should amend IDEA section 1415 to expressly provide
that a party may bring a civil action in a state court of competent
jurisdiction or a United States district court to enforce any final order
obtained in IDEA state due process proceedings. This would include
"so-ordered" stipulations of settlement by due process hearing
officers terminating the proceeding. This will allow parties to obtain
relief through procedures anchored in IDEA itself, without having to
speculate about what procedures may be available to enforce their
rights.
E. A Bar to the Addition of Exhaustion Requirements Not Contained
in Section 1415 of the Act.
Congress must also address recent developments in situations like
that found in Ellenberg v. New Mexico Military Institute, 478 F.3d
1262 (10th Cir. 2007). Since the parents there plainly completed the
IDEA exhaustion required by section 1415(i), the court acted outside
its powers in dismissing the complaint on that ground.31 2 The case
should have been decided on the merits, not because the parents were
correct, but rather, because under powers exercised by Congress
under Article I, the court was obligated to decide the case on the
merits because of its Article III responsibilities. Since some courts
may want to dispose of IDEA cases for reasons not contained in the
text of the statute's exhaustion provisions, Congress should address
this problem when it reviews the efficacy of section 1415. In
contrast to Ellenberg, the cases that have eschewed departure from
the text of IDEA's exhaustion requirements have been decided more
soundly. Following its review of section 1415's efficacy, Congress
should include a provision stating that unless a requirement is
contained in sections 1415(i) or (1), no additional procedural
requirements shall be imposed on an aggrieved party to gain access
Special Education Law Suits, 36 GA. L. REv. 465, 499-520 (2002) (relying on
legislative intent in rejecting section 1983 damage claims).
310. See supra notes 155 and 157.
311. Id.
312. Ellenberg v. New Mexico Military Institute, 478 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir.
2007).
to the court for relief under the IDEA.
F. Stipulated-to Section 504 Classifications.
With respect to students classified under section 504 by
agreement between the parties, parents should not be required to
exhaust IDEA procedures on the issue of whether the child is eligible
for IDEA classification and, thus, eligible for relief that may be
available under the IDEA. Requiring exhaustion under these
circumstances allows LEAs to "game" the system by claiming a
student "might" be IDEA eligible, although the LEA previously
admitted otherwise, implicitly or explicitly, by reason of its prior
section 504 classification of the child.
G. Direct Enforcement of Final State Complaint Procedure/CRP
Orders.
In terms of state complaint procedures/CRP, section 1415 should
be amended to (a) recognize final orders resulting from such
proceedings, and (b) permit direct enforcement actions where a final
state agency decision has been rendered on the issue in dispute.
H. Amending the Procedural Safeguards Notice.
IDEA's requirements for notice of its Part B procedural
safeguards are contained in its implementing regulations. They
require transmission of such notice to parents and others at
designated, meaningful intervals related to decision making about the
child.313 Such notices must contain pertinent information about
hearings on due process complaints, including information about
disclosure of evaluation results and recommendations. Furthermore,
where applicable, Tier-II appeals; civil actions, including the time
period within which to file such actions; and attorneys' fees should
be included.31 4 If Congress includes the proposed section 1415
313. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(c) (2008).
314. Id. IDEA also requires prior written notice whenever it proposes to or
refuses "to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child, or the provision of a FAPE to the child. Id. at § 300.503(1)-
(7).
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amendments in the Act, it should also require LEAs and SEAs to
include the new rules in their procedural safeguard notices. The
Department of Education should promulgate regulations containing
model procedural safeguard notices, in plain language, explaining
when use of the due process mechanism is mandated and when direct
actions, in derogation of ordinary exhaustion will be permitted. By
including these items as enumerated exceptions to ordinary
exhaustion, in the procedural safeguards notice, parties should be
adequately informed of what they must do and when they must do it
in order to preserve their IDEA-based rights. This notice should
feature a statement informing the parties of the specific risks
attendant to issue waivers and failures to establish at due process,
facts sufficient to meet their respective burdens of proof. It should
also advise parents that, as a prerequisite to a federal court's
jurisdiction, an agreement reached between the parties must be
approved by the hearing officer.31 5
315. In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994), a
case was removed from state to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and
was then settled. The federal court dismissed the case with the consent of the
parties, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 376-77.
Subsequently, when the defendant did not meet the terms of the settlement, the
plaintiff sought to invoke federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ruled that it
lacked authority to hear the matter. Id. at 378-82. The Court explained that there
was no case properly before the federal court, and the enforcement action would
require a separate suit that properly invoked the federal jurisdiction of the Court.
Id. The Court observed that the situation would have been different if there had
been a clause in the settlement that provided for the continuing jurisdiction of the
federal court to enforce its incorporation into the court's order of dismissal. Id. In
A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. New York City Department of Education, 407 F.3d 65, 76 (2d
Cir. 2005), the court held that a settlement agreement "so ordered" and entered by
an IDEA administrative hearing officer was sufficient to confer prevailing party
status on the parents for purposes of obtaining in federal court a fee award under
the IDEA. These rather complex requirements are almost certainly going to be a
trap for the unwary, especially the pro se parent. Clauses creating enforcement
jurisdiction in federal courts for IDEA settlement agreements should be made pro
forma. This could be achieved by statutory forms incorporating Kokkonen's
requirements and giving notice of such forms in the mandated IDEA parental
notices. For an interesting review of Kokkonen, see Morton Denlow, Federal
Jurisdiction in the Enforcement of Settlement Agreements: Kokkonen Revisited,
2003 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2 (2003) (discussing jurisdictional prerequisites and
proposal model forms contemplating maintenance of federal jurisdiction).
I. Establishment of Unambiguous Jurisdictional Requirements
Courts "lack[ ] authority to create equitable exceptions to
jurisdictional requirements."'3 16 In light of Jones, it appears that
IDEA exhaustion is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, although this
view runs contrary to the majority view in the circuits. The
jurisdictional question will remain an open one until the circuits
apply Jones to IDEA, the Supreme Court resolves this issue, or
Congress acts to fix the problem.
Since Jones, it is an open question as to whether, when required,
the failure to exhaust IDEA's administrative remedies creates a
jurisdictional bar to bringing a civil action under IDEA and other
federal laws which protect children with disabilities. In addressing
this issue, Congress should amend section 1415 and treat the failure
to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies as a jurisdictional
requirement, subject to the enumerated exceptions proposed in this
article. If plaintiff fails to establish the right to use the courts, the
case should be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction, and
the plaintiff will be relegated to IDEA due process procedures.
If plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations under this scenario initially
satisfy the new heightened pleading requirement, but later prove
insufficient factually, the complaint will be subject to dismissal after
defendant answers the complaint, in a motion for summary judgment
or on the pleadings. Since the jurisdictional facts alluded to will
always remain in the case, and since the court can always dismiss for
want of jurisdiction, even on appeal, this will not deprive defendant
of opportunities to deny plaintiff access to the court if plaintiff should
not be there. On the contrary, relief for the specified injuries for
which exhaustion is not required will enable plaintiff to avoid an
arduous, unnecessary, and unjust burden where immediate relief is
needed, re-exhaustion is unproductive or inadequate, or the due
process procedure cannot grant relief for the conduct of the agency
and its actors.
316. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
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X. SUMMARY
Enacted through Congress's Spending Clause powers, IDEA
provides fifty state jurisdictions with federal money in exchange for
implementing the Act's requirements. When parents contend their
children are being denied a Free Appropriate Public Education
(FAPE) or other IDEA benefits to which they or their children are
entitled, they may initiate administrative proceedings (due process)
prescribed by the Act. These must ordinarily be completed before
parents may sue in court to obtain relief available under IDEA, or
other federal statutes, which protect the rights of children with
disabilities where relief for those injuries is available under IDEA.
Congress has failed to particularize in the text of section 1415
when exhaustion is required and when it is excused, and how the
failure to exhaust, when required, affects courts' subject matter
jurisdiction. One consequence of this legislative failure is that
approximately 20%-21% of IDEA litigation brought in federal and
state courts involves issues of administrative exhaustion. Because of
these statutory gaps, courts have often relied on traditional
administrative law principles and the Act's legislative history to
ascertain Congress's intent. In construing exhaustion obligations and
jurisdictional prerequisites, resorting to these interpretive sources
may be unreliable and unsound methodologically, especially in light
of recent Supreme Court cases giving less weight to such sources and
placing greater emphasis on statutory text.
These ambiguities require a Congressional fix to section 1415.
This article proposes remedies for these deficiencies. The proposed
remedies include the following: Enumeration in the text of the statute
situations where exhaustion should be excused; establishing a
heightened pleading requirement when plaintiffs claim they have
satisfied a statutory ground for excusal; creating of a residue
exception for instances where exhaustion should be excused on
equitable grounds, and procedures for expediting such proceedings;
establishing agency non-compliance with final due process orders as
a basis for federal courts' jurisdiction under the IDEA, thereby
making such party "aggrieved" within the meaning of IDEA; creating
a bar in section 1415 to courts creating additional exhaustion
requirements not contained in IDEA's text; permitting direct actions
under section 504, where the parties have stipulated to the student's
status as "504 disabled" under that provision, irrespective of whether
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
the child might be IDEA eligible; granting federal court enforcement
jurisdiction for final state complaint procedure/CRP directives, and
where the parties stipulate to facts sufficient for a federal court to
apply the law; amending the procedural safeguards notice to
incorporate the above revisions, and including explanations of the
consequences of settling cases without the benefit of a due process
hearing officer's imprimatur, and how to obtain an order recognizing
the settlement by such officer sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of
the federal court for enforcement purposes. Finally, the amendments
should establish unequivocally that failure to satisfy section 1415's
exhaustion requirements goes to the court's subject matter
jurisdiction. These legislative changes will enable agencies, parents,
and the courts to better understand their respective roles in bringing
to fruition the Act's purpose of furnishing an appropriate education to
children with disabilities.
XI. CONCLUSION
IDEA's section 1415 requires Congressional review and an
amendment respecting its exhaustion and jurisdictional requirements.
In light of recent Supreme Court decisions, this need is revealed by
both a growing body of IDEA litigation over the last decade, of
which 20%-21% has consistently involved issues of administrative
exhaustion, and uncertainty about the effects of failure to exhaust,
when required, on courts' subject matter jurisdiction. These
amendments should include particularized statements in the statute's
text concerning when exhaustion is excused. This will help clarify
when direct civil actions to enforce the Act's provisions concerning a
Free Appropriate Public Education and other IDEA rights are
permitted, as well as when direct actions under other federal statutes
protecting disabled children may be commenced, without first
resorting to IDEA's administrative remedies. This article
enumerated specific proposals to accomplish that purpose.
In this regard, IDEA's pleading requirements should be amended
to enable courts to determine at the outset whether they should
adjudicate such disputes, including those exceptions to the
exhaustion requirements proposed in this article. The IDEA's text
should be amended to expressly establish clear jurisdictional
prerequisites, something not adequately addressed in the current
statute. These amendments should include heightened pleading
Fall 2009
430 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 29-2
requirements for establishing excusal of IDEA's exhaustion
requirements. By including these amendments in IDEA's notice
provisions, the result will better inform parents and other interested
persons of the role of the courts and the agencies in adjudicating
IDEA disputes. These legislative changes will enable agencies,
parents, and the courts to better understand their respective roles in
bringing to fruition the Act's purpose in furnishing an appropriate
education to children with disabilities.
XII. APPENDIX A - GLOSSARY OF TERMS
These terms are part of a much larger array of acronyms and
vocabulary related to this complicated subject:
- ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act): This is a federal law
prohibiting discrimination against individuals with
disabilities. Title II of the ADA applies to public education
and has been applied to public school students.
-Compensatory education: Although not expressly indentified
as a remedy under IDEA, it refers to services above and
beyond those normally provided to the student to make up for
deficiencies in the provision of a FAPE by the agency. It may
also be a remedy for deficiencies in services under section
504.
-EAHCA or EHA (Education for all Handicapped Children
Act): Enacted in 1975, as Public Law 94-142, it is the
predecessor to the current IDEA federal special education
legislation.
-ESY (extended school year programming): Special education
programming that extends beyond the traditional 180-day
school year.
-FAPE (free appropriate public education): This is the
yardstick by which the adequacy of a child with a disability's
program under IDEA will be measured. It includes special
education and necessary related services provided, without
charge, in conformity with state standards and a student's
IEP.
-IEP (individualized education program): This is a written plan
embodying IDEA program content requirements,
particularized for each child in special education.
- IAES (interim alternative educational setting): The placement
for a child with a disability for up to forty-five days, based
upon specific weapon or drug offenses occurring in the school
setting, authorized by IDEA itself. IDEA also authorizes a
hearing officer to place a student with a disability in an IAES
if the student determines the district has demonstrated, by
substantial evidence, that maintaining the student's current
placement is substantially likely to result in injury to the child
or others.
-IEE (independent educational evaluation): An evaluation of a
child by a qualified non-school district employee that parents
may obtain, as a right under the IDEA, when the parents
disagree with the evaluation of the agency.
-LEA (local educational agency): A public board of education
or other public authority legally constituted within a State for
either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a
service function for, public elementary schools or secondary
schools in a city, county, township, school district or other
political subdivision of the State, or for a combination of
school districts or counties that is recognized in a State as an
administrative agency for its public elementary schools or
secondary schools.
-LRE (least restrictive environment): This is an IDEA mandate
which states that school districts maximize the disabled
child's contact with nondisabled children, to the extent
appropriate in implementing the child's educational plan.
-Manifestation determination: The evaluation of the
relationship between a student's disability and act of
misconduct that must be undertaken when a district proposes
to take specified serious disciplinary actions. The same
review is required under section 504 in connection with
disciplinary actions that constitute a significant change in
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educational placement.
-NCLB (No Child Left Behind Act of 2001): Legislation
reauthorizing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. It
overhauled existing federal efforts to support elementary and
secondary education and was designed around four essential
components: accountability for results; an emphasis on
scientific research; expanded parental options; and expanded
local control and flexibility.
-OSEP (United States Office of Special Education Programs):
This is the part of the United States Department of Education
which administers the IDEA.
-SEA (state educational agency): This term is used to
designate the final state administrative level of review in
IDEA due process proceedings between parents and school
districts. Generally, such review is required before parents or
school districts are permitted, under IDEA, to obtain judicial
review. SEA is used as well to refer to the state agency
performing executive functions in carrying out state
obligations under the IDEA.
-"Section 504" rof the Rehabilitation Act]: This statute,
enacted by Congress in 1973, commonly referred to as
"section 504," prohibits recipients of federal financial
assistance, including public schools, from discriminating
against otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities,
solely on that basis. Although it is an antidiscrimination
statute, section 504 has been interpreted by the USDOE and
the courts, to include a FAPE requirement.
-USDOE or DOE (United States Department of Education):
This is the administrative agency charged with oversight of
the various federal education laws.
